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I. INTRODUCTION: YAHOO HANDS UP SHI TAO
Alone in his office in Changsha, Hunan, late on the night of April
20, 2004, Chinese journalist Shi Tao sent an e-mail using his
personal Yahoo China account to a Taiwanese colleague in New York
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City.' The e-mail summarized a government document warning
against disruptive commemorations on the upcoming fifteenth
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre and directing the
media to discourage such demonstrations.2 Two days later, the
Beijing State Security Bureau demanded that Yahoo Holdings (Hong
Kong) produce identifying information, login times, and e-mail
content for the account Mr. Shi had used.3 The notice stated that the
information pertained to an investigation into the provision of state
secrets to foreign entities.4 Yahoo complied, as it had in at least three
similar cases,5 handing over Mr. Shi's identifying information and e-
mails.6
Seven months later, state police snatched Mr. Shi from a street
near his new home in Taiyuan, Shanxi.7 They transported him the
667 miles south to Changsha, where he was imprisoned.s About a
month later, China charged Mr. Shi with the crime of "providing
state secrets to foreign entities."9 At his trial on March 11, 2005, Mr.
Shi did not contest the charge, but argued that his disclosure did not
involve "especially serious circumstances," a contention the court
rejected.10 The court nonetheless imposed a "lenient" sentence of ten
years in prison because Mr. Shi admitted his guilt and because his
crime did not cause serious harm."1 Mr. Shi is scheduled to be
released from Chishan Prison on November 24, 2014.12
1. Changsha People's Procuratorate of Hunan Province v. Shi Tao, Criminal
Verdict (Changsha Interm. People's Ct., Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://www
.lawprofessors.typepad.comlchinalaw-prof-blog/2005/09/reporterswitho.html.
2. E-mail from Shi Tao, Editor, Contemporary Trade News, to Hong Zhesheng,
Editor-in-Chief, Democracy News (Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://www.cpj.orgl
awards05/shi-tao.html#govt.
3. Beijing State Security Bureau, Notice of Evidence Collection (Apr. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.duihua.org/media/news/070725-ShiTao.pdf.
4. Id.
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN
CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 5, apps. IV-VI (2006), available at
http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2006/chinaO806chinaO806webwcover.pdf (detailing cases
of Li Zhi, Jiang Lijun, and Wang Xiaoning).
6. Catherine Holahan, Jerry Yang on the Hot Seat, Bus. WK., Nov. 6, 2007, at 11,
available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/nov2007/tc2007115
_166576.htm.
7. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at app. III.
8. Id.
9. Changsha People's Procuratorate of Hunan Province v. Shi Tao, Criminal
Verdict (Changsha Interm. People's Ct., Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://www
.lawprofessors.typepad.com/chinalawprof blog/2005/09/reporterswitho.html.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at app. III.
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A year after Mr. Shi's trial, executives of Yahoo, Microsoft,
Google, and Cisco testified in the House of Representatives regarding
their Chinese operations.13 Michael Callahan, Yahoo's general
counsel and senior vice president, said that Yahoo "had no
information about the nature of the investigation" when it gave Mr.
Shi's information to the Chinese government.14 Mr. Callahan further
asserted that Yahoo could not have withheld the information: "When
we receive a demand from law enforcement authorized under the law
of the country in which we are operating, we must comply....
Failure to comply in China could have subjected Yahoo! China and
its employees to criminal charges, including imprisonment."15
When a San Francisco-based human rights group released an
English translation of the Chinese government's request to Yahoo,16
it became clear that, contrary to Mr. Callahan's testimony, Yahoo did
have reason to know that China suspected Mr. Shi of a political
crime. Congress summoned Mr. Callahan back to Washington, along
with Yahoo CEO Jerry Wang.17 Before and during the November
2007 hearing, Mr. Callahan said he was unaware of the wording of
the Chinese government's request until October 2006 and apologized
for failing to then correct his testimony.ls The representatives at the
hearing accused Mr. Wang and Mr. Callahan of being negligent, if
not deliberately deceptive.19 Representative Tom Lantos said, "While
technologically and financially you are giants, morally you are
pygmies."20
In the United States, neither the Constitution nor any federal
law prevents the government from obtaining subscriber information
and e-mails from an Internet company, just as China obtained Shi
13. Tom Zeller, Web Firms Grilled on Dealings in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2006, at Cl.
14. The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Joint Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations
& H. Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on International Relations,
109th Cong. 2 (2006) (testimony of Michael Callahan, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.).
15, Id.
16. Keith Bradsher, China Cracks Down on News Media as Party Congress Nears,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at A3.
17. Yahoo Accused of False Testimony; Did Firm Help China in Arrest?, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at 40.
18. Corey Boles, Yahoo Executive Offers Apology to Lawmakers, WALL ST. J., Nov.
2, 2007, at A10; Yahoo Executive Apologizes to Congressional Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 2007, at C9.
19. Corey Boles, Don Clark & Pui-Wing Tam, Yahoo's Lashing Highlights Risks of
China Market, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2007, at Al.
20. Id.; Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Lied About China, Legislators Say, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7, 2007, at D5.
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Tao's records from Yahoo.21 Nonetheless, the day after Mr.
Callahan's first appearance on Capitol Hill, Representatives
Christopher Smith and Lantos sponsored the Global Online Freedom
Act.22 The bill was reintroduced in 2007 and remains pending.23
Among other things, it bars U.S. companies from divulging (without
approval from the Department of Justice) electronically stored
information to governments that restrict Internet access. 24 Though
ostensibly aimed at preventing Internet companies from behaving
"immorally," the proposed Act of course seeks to promote the freedom
to speak on political and religious matters. 25 In other words, Yahoo's
actions are morally blameworthy only from a perspective that is
sympathetic to Shi Tao's ideology and his defiance of Chinese law.
After all, like China, the United States both prevents26 and
21. In fact, the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access Act vests in government investigators the authority to seize without a
warrant electronic communications stored with Internet companies, provided only that
the information "[is] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). Some statutes prevent the seizure of documents in particular
circumstances. For example, the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 prohibits the
government from using criminal search and seizure power to prevent the publication
of information. See Pub. L. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
2000aa (2006)). But no law prevents a corporation like Yahoo from giving up its
customers. Internet companies acknowledge this in their disclosures to their
customers. See, e.g., Google Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (stating that Google will divulge "personal information"
when it has "a good faith belief that access, use, preservation or disclosure of such
information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, legal
process or enforceable governmental request, (b) enforce applicable Terms of Service,
including investigation of potential violations thereof, (c) detect, prevent, or otherwise
address fraud, security or technical issues, or (d) protect against imminent harm to the
rights, property or safety of Google, its users or the public as required or permitted by
law"); Yahoo Privacy Policy, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ details.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008) (stating that Yahoo will divulge "personal information" when
"[w]e believe it is necessary to share information in order to investigate, prevent, or
take action regarding illegal activities, suspected fraud, situations involving potential
threats to the physical safety of any person, violations of Yahoo's terms of use, or as
otherwise required by law").
22. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4.
23. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (Jan. 5, 2007) (as
passed by H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Oct. 23, 2007).
24. Id. §§ 201, 202.
25. China claims in its constitution to guarantee freedom of expression. XIAN FA
art. 35, § 2 (2004) (P.R.C.), translated at http://english.gov.cr/2005-
08/05/content_20813 .htm ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.").
Obviously, these rights are not honored by the government.
26. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that state secrets doctrine barred disclosure of government document relating
to classified intelligence-gathering activities); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296
[Vol. 60:3
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punishes27 the dissemination of "state secrets." More to the point,
those outraged over Mr. Shi's fate might be surprised to learn that
U.S. law enforcement agencies can obtain a person's information and
correspondence from an Internet company as easily as the Chinese
government can. They might also be surprised that the Constitution,
as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, would arguably not
be implicated had Shi Tao's case arisen in the United States.
The Fourth Amendment, despite its terms, presently fails to
protect from arbitrary government inspection intangible and tangible
items that Americans consider theirs. This is because it is generally
accepted that the Amendment protects nebulous "expectations of
privacy." This Article argues that the Amendment may protect
privacy, but that it does so by protecting property-"persons, houses,
papers, and effects"-from searches unsupported by individualized
suspicion. Its effectiveness is diminished, not aided, by the pretense
that it protects privacy directly and by the fallacy that the
constitutionality of a search depends on the government's need for
making it. In addition, the Article argues that the Amendment's
protection of property cannot be realized as long as it remains the
law that an easily obtained search warrant essentially forecloses any
inquiry into whether the search was made with good cause.
Part II of this Article describes how the Supreme Court came to
rely on "expectations of privacy" and on the warrant procedure and
discusses the faulty assumptions underlying these pillars of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III examines the utility of the
"expectations of privacy" framework and the warrant procedure by
comparing how the two principal Fourth Amendment theories treat
each in application. Part IV describes how a pragmatic, nontechnical
approach to defining property for Fourth Amendment purposes and
focusing on the existence of probable cause rather than on the
warrant procedure can form the basis for a more rational, enduring
search-and-seizure jurisprudence.
If the Fourth Amendment is to endure with any vitality, the
contrived "expectations of privacy" framework, which enables Fourth
Amendment protections to be gradated and individualized suspicion
(4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing tort suit alleging illegal detention and torture because state
secrets doctrine barred discovery of information necessary to plaintiffs case).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming
conviction of Cuban nationals charged with espionage activities); United States v. Lee,
589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming conviction for selling defense secrets to Soviet
agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794); Dan Eggen, Report Finds FBI Still Vulnerable
to Espionage, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2007, at A4 (discussing two cases in which FBI
employees were convicted of spying and sentenced to prison); Christopher Marquis,
Threats and Responses: Espionage; Jury Rules out Death Penalty for Failed Spy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at A17 (discussing three cases in which government employees
convicted of spying were spared death penalty).
20081
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to become increasingly dispensable, must be abandoned. Houses,
which are currently singled out as bastions of protected privacy, are
no longer the primary repository of the very papers and effects the
Framers most sought to protect, as the seizure of Mr. Shi's political
communiqu6s makes only too clear. Further, it must be recognized
that the much-lauded warrant procedure has evolved to protect the
government at the expense of the citizenry. A search warrant now
generally offers little if any protection against government invasions
of private property and serves primarily to obviate adversarial
challenge to the government's claimed reason for searching.
II. ABSTRACT FOURTH AMENDMENT VALUES: PRIVACY AND
PROCEDURE
Black letter law inculcated upon law students for years posits
that the Fourth Amendment protects "expectations of privacy" and
that it does so by generally requiring police to obtain a warrant
before making a search. The cases insist that a judge will issue a
warrant only when there is good reason ("probable cause") to believe
a crime has been committed or is underway. The so-called "warrant
requirement" may be excused only in certain circumstances where
practicalities so demand. These premises raise difficult conundrums
for students in the classroom, police on the streets, and judges on the
bench because they do not square with experience. First,
"expectations of privacy" are subjective specters that, like shapes in
the clouds, judges view idiosyncratically. The advent of new
technologies and shifting social attitudes toward the dissemination of
personal information will only exacerbate the difficulties in
predicating constitutional protection on anything so abstract and
manipulable as privacy. Second, warrants provide marginal if any
protection from government overreaching. The vast majority of
searches take place without a warrant; it is the exceptional search
that is supported by one. Judges are known to issue warrants
perfunctorily. Reexamining these Fourth Amendment myths shows
how the Amendment's unpredictable and arbitrary jurisprudence can
be rationalized only by abandoning these precepts.
A. The Divination of "Expectations of Privacy"
"Expectations of privacy" are a legal fiction of relatively recent
invention. Before 1967, a Fourth Amendment violation entailed a
government trespass on a property interest.28 Property interests were
defined so legalistically that the Court's jurisprudence distinguished
28. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961); Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
455-57 (1928).
[Vol. 60:3
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between items that were mere evidence of a crime (which could not
be seized) and items used to commit crime or derived from crime
(which could be seized).29 This dichotomy had its roots in Boyd v.
United States,30 a forfeiture action. The claimant in Boyd appealed a
district court order requiring him to produce a certain invoice, which
the government wanted to prove its entitlement to property on which
duties were allegedly evaded.31 The challenge having been brought
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court considered
whether the compelled production was an act of self-incrimination
and whether it was tantamount to an unreasonable search.
Concluding it amounted to an unreasonable search, the Court leapt
to the conclusion that mere evidence of a crime could not, by its
nature, be the object of a reasonable search.32 Only property that the
government had a right to possess, like contraband, could be the
target of a constitutional search and seizure.33
This distinction between "mere evidence" and contraband was
dubious and unworkable from its adoption. The principal authority
for Boyd's holding, Entick v. Carrington,34 proposed no such
dichotomy.35 In that celebrated eighteenth-century English case,
Lord Camden upheld a jury verdict in Entick's favor after agents of
the Crown ransacked his house searching for seditious writing.36
Emphasizing the centrality of property rights to English civilization,
Entick criticized general warrants for lacking the important
safeguards that attended warrants to search for specific stolen
items.37 These procedures, which required that the theft victim be
present at the search and swear that his stolen property was in a
particular place, ensured that an unreasonable search could be
quickly redressed.38 Entick is universally agreed to be among the
29. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921).
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. Id. at 617-18.
32. Id. at 623. Justice Miller and Chief Justice Waite believed that the production
did not constitute a search or seizure but concurred on the ground that it violated the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 639-40 (Miller, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 623 (majority opinion).
34. 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
35. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 61
(1969).
36. Entick, 19 Howell's St. Trials at 1029.
37. Id.
38. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 628. The late Professor Telford Taylor likewise emphasized
the importance of procedural safeguards to common law searches, likening wiretap
authorizations with general warrants. See TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 82. He
emphasized that, unlike surveillance orders, search warrants required an inventory
and a return. Id. By requiring that the officer executing the warrant furnish the target
20081
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primary inspirations for the Fourth Amendment.39 Boyd departed
from Entick's focus on the distinctions between specific searches and
general searches and held that a search's legality depended on the
nature of the items sought. The decision was widely criticized as
much for lacking sense as for hampering effective law enforcement.40
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in 1967's Warden v.
Hayden abandoned Boyd's "mere evidence" rule and held that police
officers could seek and seize clothing that matched a description of
what a bank robber wore.41 Noting that searches may be
unconstitutional even where the government seizes stolen goods,
instrumentalities of crime, or contraband,42 the Court sonorously
declared "that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property."43 The Court further
noted that the remedy of suppression, constitutionally mandated in
state as well as federal courts just six years earlier,44 provided more
tailored and effective protection than limits on the type of property
that police could seize.45
By saying that the Amendment primarily protects "privacy
rather than property," Hayden cast these as competing rather than
complementary Fourth Amendment concerns.46  Privacy was
unnecessarily declared the rightful and exclusive claimant to the
with an inventory of everything seized, the common law created a record that could be
referenced in any controversy over the search. Id.
39. See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 32 (2005); TAYLOR, supra note
35, at 29-38; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 772-75 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 411-12 (1974); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 982-87; Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 603-07 (1999);
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
396-97 (1995).
.40. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 nn.6 & 7 (1967); TAYLOR, supra note
35, at 68-70.
41. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 309-10.
42. Id. at 305.
43. Id. at 304.
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961). Suppression of unconstitutionally
seized evidence has been required in federal cases since 1914. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1914).
45. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307.
46. They are still commonly discussed as mutually exclusive rather than
complementary concepts. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth
Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307
(1998) (treating property and privacy as exclusive or competing values and arguing
that Fourth Amendment protects third value of "security).
[Vol. 60:3
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Amendment's focus. 47 The Court could have departed from a strict,
technical trespass requirement without severing the Fourth
Amendment's connection to property interests. For example, as
Justice Fortas and Chief Justice Warren noted, the case could have
been decided simply by expanding the category of items susceptible
to government seizure to include identifying clothing.4s
A few months later, Katz v. United States,49 a case that
occasioned five opinions, cemented "expectations of privacy" as the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment's protection. Charles Katz
was convicted of transmitting wagering information across the
country by telephone in violation of a federal statute. 50 He challenged
the admission of recordings made without a warrant of calls he
placed from a public payphone.51 Rejecting the doctrine that the
hallmark of a Fourth Amendment violation was a trespass on
property, the Court held that the wiretap "violated the privacy upon
which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."52 As Justice Harlan noted, the critical fact was
not whether telephone booths were generally public, but that under
the circumstances the conversation was private.53 Justice Harlan's
concurrence set out the threshold test still used to determine
whether government action implicates the Fourth Amendment:
"[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'54 Justice Stewart's
majority opinion was less simplistic and therefore of less ready
application. Ironically, it declared that "the Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'
That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
47. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306, 308; Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided:
How the Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33,
35-36 (2005). As Professor Cloud notes, Hayden also repudiated the link between the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which had been central to the Court's enforcement of
privacy concerns for eighty years. Id.; see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
456 & n.7 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
48. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 311-12. (Fortas, J., dissenting).
49. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
50. id. at 348.
51. Id. at 348-49.
52. Id. at 353.
53. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id.; see, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 130 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979); see also
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97-98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing
"Katz test").
2008]
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governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all."55
Katz's nuances have unfortunately been buried by repetition of
the pithy notion that the Fourth Amendment guarantees a right to
privacy, which Katz is now taken to hold.56 It is true that the concept
of privacy figured prominently in the Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions before Hayden and Katz.57 But prior to 1967, the Court
55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
56. See, e.g., Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The Fourth
Amendment protects privacy."); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("A
search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the
individual of dominion over his or her person or property."); United States v. Quinn,
475 U.S. 791, 793 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) ("It is
axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures protects personal privacy interests, not property rights."); Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 758 (1985) ("The Fourth Amendment protects 'expectations of privacy'-the
individual's legitimate expectation that in certain places and at certain times he has
'the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men."'); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("The Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than simply places.");
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) ("The Fourth Amendment 'protects
people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy."'); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) ("The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings."); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 504 (1978) ("The 'basic purpose of this Amendment ... is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.");
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) ("[Tlhe central concern of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive
interference by government officials."); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242
(1973) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects the 'security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police."'); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 96 (1938) (stating that "standard line is"
that Fourth Amendment protects privacy); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (1999) ("[T]here seems
to be widespread agreement on the twin propositions that (1) Fourth Amendment law
should protect privacy, and (2) the protection should tend to increase as the privacy
invasion increases.").
57. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.") (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967))); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) C'The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion
by the State."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("Since the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government."); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society."); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628
(1946) ("[W]hen petitioner, in order to obtain the government's business, specifically
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seemed to understand that the Amendment's underlying purpose of
protecting privacy was effected through its explicit provision of
security for property.5s Now, the Court attempts to protect privacy
directly. Privacy's primacy is so taken for granted that occasionally
the Court has had to revisit the idea that the Fourth Amendment
protects property interests as well.59 Generally, and despite its text,
the Amendment's solicitude for property has been disregarded.60
The Court has never supposed, however, that the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy in all its aspects. Privacy is an
extremely broad concept that must compete in an open society with
the need to keep certain information and activities in the public
domain.61 The type of privacy the Amendment is said to ensure is
embraced by the idea that each person is entitled to withdraw from
the world (and the government) into a sacrosanct space with his
thoughts and ideas. As Justice Brandeis famously formulated the
notion, the Fourth Amendment supposedly guarantees "the right to
be let alone,"62 though this is more a rhetorical than a categorical
characterization.
agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such
claim to privacy which he otherwise might have had as respects business documents
related to those contracts."); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ('The
Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable and is construed
liberally to safeguard the right of privacy."); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J.,
dissenting) ('With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the
Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring
incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable
searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy.").
58. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) ("The restrictions
upon searches and seizures were obviously designed for protection against official
invasion of privacy and the security of property.").
59. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992) ("[O]ur cases unmistakably
hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy.").
60. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 & n.5 (1984) (stating that
Fourth Amendment "search" entails infringement of privacy interests while "seizure"
entails interference with possessory interests and noting that "the concept of a
'seizure' of property is not much discussed in our cases").
61. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1020-21 (1995). For comprehensive analyses of the threats to
privacy and possible legal responses to those, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) (discussing diminution of privacy
rights associated with technological advancement); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain
Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173; Jed Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) (analyzing extent of constitutional
guarantee to privacy and advancing modern conception of privacy doctrine).
62. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890).
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Fourth Amendment privacy does not embrace the notion that
one should be able to venture into the public sphere (whether in the
physical world or on the Internet) and enjoy social interaction
without having his words and deeds recorded.63 This type of privacy
frees us from having to account for every word uttered and every
action taken, permitting spontaneous rather than restrained
exchanges.64 If we are entitled to be obscure and forgettable, it is not
because of the Fourth Amendment. The Court made this clear in the
1963 case Lopez v. United States, in which the defendant argued that
a surreptitious recording of German Lopez's attempt to bribe an IRS
agent should be inadmissible.65
In other cases, the Court likewise approved the admission of
testimony and recorded conversations by informants and undercover
agents, reasoning in each case that no property had been trespassed
to obtain the evidence.66 The subsequent adoption of privacy as the
Fourth Amendment's primary concern did not occasion reversal of
63. Froomkin, supra note 61, at 1506 (noting that modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence does not constrain government's ability to conduct surveillance in public
forums).
64. As Justice Harlan deftly explained, government monitoring can be destructive
of the public sphere:
Authority is hardly required to support the proposition that words would be
measured a good deal more carefully and communication inhibited if one
suspected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed. Were
third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that
spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant
discourse-that liberates daily life. Much offhand exchange is easily
forgotten and one may count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by
the very fact of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will
either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener's inability to
reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a documented
record.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-88 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 762-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free
discourse and spontaneous utterances. Free discourse-a First Amendment value-
may be frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reactionary or revolutionary, profane or
in good taste; but it is not free if there is surveillance. Free discourse liberates the
spirit, though it may produce only froth."); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 314 (1972) ("The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to
an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official
eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in
private conversation.").
65. 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) ("Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument
amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the
agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being beset by
corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment.").
66. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437-38 (1963); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1952).
PROPERTY AND PROBABLE CAUSE
these decisions.67 In fact, these decisions would be recast in the
privacy rubric to support the idea that information once shared
ceases to be private.
Closely related to obscurity is the notion that one is entitled to
wander in and out of supermarkets, malls, parks, airports,
courthouses, and Web sites anonymously. But the Supreme Court
has made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the
government from surveilling us in public, at least with bare human
senses: "[I]n fact we have held that visual observation is no 'search'
at all-perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact our
doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively
unconstitutional."68 Even when technology is employed, the Fourth
Amendment may offer no protection. In United States v. Knotts, for
example, the Court held that using a hidden transmitter to track a
defendant's automobile from Minnesota to Wisconsin did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment because it revealed nothing
private.69 "A person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another."70 Nowadays, police can use a
target's own cellular telephone as a tracking device, and courts have
sharply divided over whether this information is private under the
Amendment.71
Nor does Fourth Amendment privacy keep us from having to
identify ourselves to the police. Anonymity was not historically a fact
of life. For hundreds of years, the Supreme Court reminds us,
nightwalker statutes authorized the detention of strangers walking
through town at night.72 The Fourth Amendment does not deny law
enforcement the modern equivalent of being able to spot an outsider
in town-being able to ask for identification. In Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Court of Nevada, the Supreme Court rebuffed a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a Nevada statute authorizing police to
67. See White, 401 U.S. at 752 (holding that defendant's expectation that his
conversation with police informant would remain private did not require suppression
of substance of transmitted or recorded conversation).
68. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Terry
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1998)
(arguing that officer's watching person walk on public sidewalk constituted Fourth
Amendment "search").
69. 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
70. Id. at 281.
71. See In re Application of the U.S., No. H-07-613, 2007 WL 3036849, at *4 &
nn.5-6 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007); In re Application of the U.S., 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 &
n.4 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Application of the U.S., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005);
In re Application of U.S., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
72. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 183 (2004); Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333-34 (2001).
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require identification on pain of arrest.73 Amazingly, Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion manages to never once use the word
"privacy," underscoring that Fourth Amendment privacy is
arbitrarily defined on the basis of shifting policy concerns. 74
The species of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects
continues to be primarily that having a direct connection to property.
Rather than expanding the Amendment's sweep, Hayden and Katzs
move to the direct protection of privacy allows judges to disregard
property interests whenever they find it expedient.75 Indeed, two
Justices once argued that the owner of a boat used for drug
smuggling had no expectation that the government would not
arbitrarily search his own boat because he had never personally used
it.76 The misguided rejection of property as the Amendment's central
concern overlooked both its text and the substantial protection that
the link to property uniquely afforded, if only because judges and
lawyers are more able to discern property interests than expectations
of privacy.
Continued insistence by courts and scholars on calibrating
Fourth Amendment protections on privacy expectations is doomed to
yield only more confusion and dissatisfaction, as technology and new
communication fads force a revaluation of privacy itself.77 Already,
73. 542 U.S. at 188.
74. The opinion says only that the government's interest in identifying suspicious
characters outweighs "the individual's Fourth Amendment interests," presumably
because it would be incongruous in that context to label those interests "privacy." Id.
75. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2006) ("While the Katz
principle was originally used to expand Fourth Amendment protection to cover
government invasions of privacy in public places like phone booths, it can also serve to
contract such protection in private places such as homes."). Compare, e.g., Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (holding that anyone lawfully on premises
searched had standing to contest search), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83, 84-85 (1980) (holding that rationale underlying automatic standing doctrine
had been undermined by subsequent decision), with Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,
90-91 (1998) (holding that person invited into another's home for "commercial
purposes" had no legitimate expectation of privacy in that home and could not object to
search).
76. United States v. Quinn, 475 U.S. 791, 793 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari, joined by Blackmun, J.).
77. Even while recognizing that the Court's efforts to protect "expectations of
privacy" has produced an incoherent and unpredictable jurisprudence, the large
majority of scholars seem to accept that the idea is fundamentally sound and capable
of being salvaged. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007) (arguing that "expectations of privacy" label
refers to not one but four distinct approaches that should receive express judicial
recognition). Professor Stuntz argues that the Fourth Amendment would work better if
it protected other equally abstract values while acknowledging the significant
obstacles to developing such a jurisprudence. See Stuntz, supra note 61 (arguing that
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drug-sniffing dogs and high-tech innovations that amplify the
government's surveillance capabilities have rendered the simplistic
Katz test increasingly less predictable and less useful. Katz's flaws
are compounded by the seismic transformations in the value that
individuals place on keeping information private (i.e., secret) in the
Internet age. The past decade has seen adolescents and college
students (as well as some older folks) publish intimate details of their
lives on social Web sites, apparently emulating the entertainment
media's compulsion for sensationalizing every banal detail of
celebrities' lives. Web sites such as Myspace and Facebook encourage
their members to publicize huge amounts of information historically
deemed intimate-who their friends are, whom they are dating, their
sexual orientations, their birthdates, what hobbies and sports they
enjoy, what political causes they advocate, what movies and
television shows they like, what books they read, what music they
listen to-and to post pictures of themselves, their relatives, and
their friends. Cellular telephone carriers now offer customers "social-
mapping services"-the ability to view a map on their cellular phone
screens showing where their friends and family members are
physically located at that moment.78 Regardless of whether the
exuberant impulse of young people to overestimate how interesting
they are sustains itself over the long term, the already amorphous
and unpredictable "expectations of privacy" test will become
increasingly meaningless in light of the new willingness to share
historically private information with virtual "friends."
B. The Vaunting of the Warrant Procedure
Even when a judge deems an "expectation of privacy" reasonable,
the government may invade that privacy if it shows good reason to
believe a crime has been committed or is being committed. The
Supreme Court has insisted for decades that, whenever possible,
courts should determine in advance of a search whether police have
such probable cause to believe a crime has occurred and, if so, issue a
search warrant. The Court professes ad nauseum that this warrant
procedure adds value, repeatedly invoking the legendary "neutral
and detached" magistrate who ensures that searches are justified.79
Fourth Amendment should focus on police force and coercion); Stuntz, supra note 56
(same and noting that "developing workable rules might be impossible").
78. Anita Hamilton, A Wireless Street Fight, TIME, Feb. 15, 2007 (describing Sprint
Nextel's Loopt and Helio's Buddy Beacon services); Laura M. Holson, Privacy Lost:
These Phones Can Find You, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at Al (same). Customers can
disable the tracking service whenever they do not want their location published. Id.
79. As the Court once put it:
"Over and over again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," and that
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This magistrate supposedly offers significant protection from
overzealous police officers whose judgment may be compromised by
their role as law enforcers.s0 The understanding that what the
Fourth Amendment offers is "neutral" review of warrant applications
was famously (and perhaps best) articulated by Justice Jackson:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption
that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers
in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure
only in the discretion of police officers.81
Eloquent though this is, the validity of the reasoning is hardly self-
evident.
First, the police are not alone in wanting to see criminals
brought to justice. So, a judicial officer is comparatively
"disinterested" only in the sense that his career advancement does
not depend on the number of seizures, arrests, or convictions he
makes. But judges and magistrates presumably share their
community's interest in seeing criminals punished and, as a result,
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior judicial
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (collecting cases) (footnotes omitted);
see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ("The presence of a
search warrant serves a high function.").
80. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) ("The judicial warrant has
a significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."'); Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring)
("Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where
they believe national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested,
and neutral as a court or magistrate must be."); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
498 (1958) ('"Were federal officers free to search without a warrant merely upon
probable cause to believe that certain articles were within a home, the provisions of
the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it affords
largely nullified."); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) ("In their
understandable zeal to ferret out crime and in the excitement of the capture of a
suspected person, officers are less likely to possess the detachment and neutrality with
which the constitutional rights of the suspect must be viewed.").
81. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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ordinarily lack the instinct to greet every one-sided warrant
application with skepticism. Second, judicial officers have no
particular advantage in terms of expertise, resources, or incentive
over police and prosecutors in reviewing requests for warrants. As
trained lawyers, judges may be more able to adopt a deontological
perspective, realizing that society is ultimately better off even-
handedly enforcing the rights of all, although some guilty people
escape punishment.82 But, as Professor Goldstein pointed out,
because judges lack the information and the motivation needed to
scrutinize a warrant request effectively, the interposition of a judicial
officer does little to mitigate the police's assumed consequentialist
motives.83
That warrant applications are reviewed in secret and without
opposition allows for the propagation of the false impression that this
review is more probing than it is.s4 This misimpression, in turn, is
easily exploited by the executive branch to defend dubious searches
and seizures made under a warrant's authority. For example, the
Department of Justice defended its secret arrests of material
witnesses after September 11, stating that each arrest warrant was
judicially approved, thus falsely implying that judges carefully
examined the government's claims regarding each detainee.85 It has
long been common knowledge among practitioners and scholars "that
judges 'rubber stamp' warrant applications and barely supervise the
process."86 Conceding the lack of empirical proof for this, Professor
82. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 111 (1988) ("[Jludges may be able to see, in
ways that police officers cannot, how assumptions about who is likely to have
committed a crime are themselves the product of social contexts.").
83. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1024-25 (1974).
84. As the Court put it:
[T]he usual reliance of our legal system on adversary proceedings itself
should be an indication that an ex parte inquiry is likely to be less vigorous.
The magistrate has no acquaintance with the information that may
contradict the good faith and reasonable basis of the affiant's allegations.
The pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, because of the
understandable desire to act before the evidence disappears; this urgency
will not always permit the magistrate to make an extended independent
examination of the affiant or other witnesses.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
85. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared":
Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet,
58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 687-88 (2005).
86. Goldstein, supra note 83, at 1025; accord TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 48 ("At the
preliminary show cause hearing, the magistrate will generally rely on the police
representations, since he is unlikely to have either the time or the means to go behind
them."); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
20081
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
Goldstein posited that American judges are inhibited in reviewing
warrant applications because they habitually rely on counsel to raise
issues, are institutionally unaccustomed to supervising prosecutorial
processes, and lack adequate staff to dispatch such administrative
duties.87 Professor Goldstein's logic is amply supported by the
anecdotal evidence in case reports.SS
Even assuming that magistrates are as conscientious and
thorough as can be, they simply lack the resources to truly test the
government's contentions in an ex parte warrant-application process.
This is demonstrated by the difficulties involved in evaluating the
government's recent applications for permission to track a person's
cellular telephone.89 When the government sought reconsideration of
the first published order denying such an application, the magistrate
sought to appoint a lawyer (obviously without alerting the target) to
brief an adversarial position; fortuitously, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation sought leave to do so.90 Subsequently, several district
and magistrate judges have noted in such cases that "the best way to
test the limit of the Government's authority may be through
developed records, trial court opinions on suppression motions, and
appellate review."91 The technical intricacies of those applications
highlighted the one-sidedness inherent in every warrant request and
our system's entrenched dependence on an adversary to explore an
issue thoroughly.
Furthermore, the possibility of an incomplete or unscrupulous
presentation makes the task of meaningful review nearly
impossible.92 The Supreme Court has set the standard for the quality
881, 888 (1991) (describing magistrates' review of warrant applications as typically
"slapdash"); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 22 ("[The 'rubber stamp'
quality of magistrate review of warrant applications is an open scandal, and the Court
has done little to show that it takes its own procedures seriously.").
87. See Goldstein, supra note 83, at 1024-25.
88. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 554 (2004) (finding that magistrate
judge signed facially defective warrant that was based on tip from "concerned citizen,"
was drafted by federal agent, and failed to describe object of search). But see McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (stating that "there is vague and general
testimony in the record that on previous occasions the officers had sought search
warrants but had been denied them").
89. These applications are regulated by statutes in addition to the Fourth
Amendment, but the principle nonetheless applies.
90. In re Application of the U.S., 396 F. Supp. 2d 295, 299 & n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(noting court "would benefit from adversarial testing" of government's position).
91. In re Application of the U.S., No. H-07-613, 2007 WL 3036849, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 17, 2007) (citing In re Application of the U.S., 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007)).
92. TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 48 ("If the Supreme Court's recent holding, that the
identity of informers need not be disclosed on inquiry into probable cause, survives,
the protective value of the search warrant hearing will be even smaller than
hitherto.").
[Vol. 60:3
2008] PROPERTY AND PROBABLE CAUSE
of information that can support a warrant so low that judges can
hardly be expected to uncover a baseless request. A warrant affidavit
is sufficient though based only on hearsay-including statements of
undisclosed informants-as long as there is a "substantial basis" for
crediting the hearsay.93 The Court countenances surreptitious,
unwarranted searches by law enforcement officers94 and even
reckless and outright lies in the warrant affidavit,95 provided that
probable cause independent of the police misconduct justifies the
search.96 In response to the argument that tolerating willful, illegal
searches discourages police to seek warrants, the Court simply
declared that police would be "foolish" to take such a risk.97 To
complement this laxity, the Court has decreed that warrant
affidavits carry a "presumption of validity," somewhat relaxing the
government's burden of establishing probable cause "supported by
Oath or affirmation."98
The same factors that make warrants easy to obtain-judges'
lack of institutional competence to scrutinize warrant requests, the
ex parte process, the lax standards, and the presumption that police
claims are true-ensure that judges sometimes issue warrants when
probable cause turns out to be lacking. The Supreme Court
addressed this in 1984 by holding that, when a judge erroneously
93. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239-40 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
114 (1964), overruled on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. at 213; Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1980).
94. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 543-44 (1988).
95. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
96. Murray, 487 U.S. at 543-44; Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. The Court's permitting
the issuance of such warrants reflects an abandonment of the judicial integrity
rationale that underpinned not only the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule but
other exclusionary rules as well. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) ("The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy
a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence."). This rationale underlay the Court's
overturning convictions of Communists in the 1950s. Then, the Court refused to so
much as pass upon the sufficiency of a record sullied by perjured testimony, holding
that it would demean the very concept of justice for it to do so. See Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 808, 811 (1956) ("This Court should not pass on a record containing
unresolved allegations of tainted testimony. The integrity of the judicial process is at
stake."); Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S.
115, 124 (1956) ('"When uncontested challenge is made that a finding of subversive
design by petitioner was in part the product of three perjurious witnesses, it does not
remove the taint for a reviewing court to find that there is ample innocent testimony to
support the Board's findings.").
97. Murray, 487 U.S. at 540. But see Craig M. Bradley, Murray v. United States:
The Bell Tolls for the Warrant Requirement, 64 IND. L. J. 907, 917-18 (1989)
(demonstrating that Murray encourages police to ignore warrant requirement).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
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issues a warrant, the law will pretend that no error was made.99
Rather than excluding evidence seized under an invalid warrant,
which is the usual constitutionally mandated result for Fourth
Amendment violations,100 courts will admit the evidence as though
probable cause justified the search. This "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule proceeds from the idea that excluding evidence in
such circumstances would only "punish the errors of judges and
magistrates" who, unlike the police, are undoubtedly well-
intentioned.101
The "good faith" exception has been criticized since its
creation,02 and some state supreme courts have rejected it under
their constitutions.103 However, there is no reason to believe it will be
reconsidered or overruled. The Supreme Court has only broadened
the scope of unconstitutional searches and seizures that are exempt
from the exclusionary rule.104 Evidence obtained through searches
and seizures because a court clerk failed to record the quashing of a
warrant 05 or because police mistakenly believed they had consent to
search106 is admissible.07 The rationale in such cases is that,
notwithstanding the lack of probable cause, punishing such mistakes
by excluding evidence serves no useful purpose.
III. DUELING THEORIES IN A MUDDLED JURISPRUDENCE
Despite never seriously doubting that the Fourth Amendment
protects an implied right to privacy,1os scholars and Supreme Court
Justices have dueled for decades over competing textualist theories of
99. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984).
100. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
101. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
102. See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 906 & n.5 (1986)
(collecting authorities).
103. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1993); State v. Guzman,
842 P.2d 660, 671 (Id. 1992).
104. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006) (holding that violation
of Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce requirement for home searches did not
require exclusion of evidence).
105. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
106. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
107. The Court may yet use this rationale to further limit the application of the
exclusionary rule. See Herring v. United States, 492 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1221 (2008).
108. But see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[The Fourth Amendment] did not guarantee some generalized right of privacy and
leave it to this Court to determine which particular manifestations of the value of
privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.") (internal quotations omitted);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is impossible for
me to think that the wise Framers of the Fourth Amendment would ever have
dreamed about drafting an amendment to protect the 'right of privacy."').
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how it does so and how the warrant procedure furthers this aim.109
One might suppose that it makes a big difference which theory
prevails. But comparing the two in application suggests that
inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are attributable
less to any difference between the theories than to problems inherent
in their shared premises.11o In addition to assuming that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to regulate all government searches and
seizures, both theories assume that the Amendment protects
"privacy" in the abstract and that the warrant procedure provides a
meaningful check on the executive branch. These fallacies make it
impossible for either theory to prescribe meaningful, principled
criteria for limiting government searches at the threshold.
The advocates of the "warrant preference" theory and
"reasonableness" theory have spilled much ink debating the meaning
of the word "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment and how its
two clauses grammatically relate to each other."' Proponents of each
approach claim that their interpretation is more faithful to the
Framers' intent and therefore more legitimate.112 The generally
accepted fact that the Framers never intended the Fourth
109. One striking example of the conflation resulting from enforcing an interpretive
core value through textualist construction is seen in Justice Stevens's dissent in Kyllo,
which argues that heat emanating from a house cannot be private because the Fourth
Amendment "guarantees the right of people 'to be secure in their ... houses' against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
110. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can arguably be broken down into smaller
groupings, but the inherent problems of unpredictability and subjectivity persist. See
Clancy, supra note 39, at 978 (identifying five models of Fourth Amendment analysis);
Kerr, supra note 77, at 506 (identifying four models). Such groupings, moreover, tend
to be descriptive constructs for understanding past decisions rather than top-down
theories for organizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
111. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Both
interpretations are rooted in decisions that predate the 1967 christening of privacy as
the core Fourth Amendment concern, although these early cases do not fully square
with either modern theory. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948) (holding that house search without warrant was unconstitutional); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that car search for bootlegged liquor
was reasonable without warrant). However, centering the Amendment on a
noninterpretivist core value rendered the textualist debate utterly nonsensical.
112. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 39, at 1099-1100; Amsterdam, supra note 39, at
377-78 (1974); Clancy, supra note 39, at 1040; Davies, supra note 39, at 591; Tracey
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994); James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in
on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1139-40 (1992).
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Amendment to regulate every conceivable government search is
essentially ignored by both sides.113
The "warrant preference" theory posits that the Amendment's
Warrant Clause modifies its Reasonableness Clause. Searches are
generally unreasonable when they are not authorized by a
warrant.114 Warrantless searches are permitted only when so-called
"exigent circumstances" or "special needs" make it impossible or
impracticable to obtain a warrant in advance. Warrants must be
supported by probable cause and describe particularly what is to be
searched or seized. They provide a judicial, and thus neutral,
determination of whether probable cause exists, as well as notice of
the scope of the police's authority. Searches without probable cause
are permitted in (formerly) narrow circumstances, but some
individual suspicion is always required absent "special needs." This
vague phrase supposedly comprises government aims distinct from
"ordinary law enforcement." In such cases, the perceived press of the
government's special need is balanced against the perceived import of
the privacy interest at stake.115
The "reasonableness" theory, on the other hand, postulates that
the Reasonableness Clause is grammatically independent of the
Warrant Clause. Under this reading, the Fourth Amendment
requires only that all searches and seizures be reasonable.116
"Reasonable" is given varying colloquial glosses on an ad hoc basis.
Some searches, primarily those of a home, are reasonable only when
authorized by a warrant, but warrants are not generally necessary.11 7
113. The Framers most likely meant to proscribe only the general searches that
stirred resentment among the colonists, leaving specific searches to be regulated by
statutory or common law. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the
Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 719, 730-31 (2007).
114. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 592-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Only in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."). That a court should ever
be able to disregard a value judgment enshrined in the Constitution is a galling and
self-repudiating contention. If Justice Blackmun is correct that the "warrant
preference" theory cannot account for some searches, the answer is not to evaluate
those searches ad hoc but to adopt r. theory that works.
116. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring) ('The Fourth Amendment
does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely
prohibits searches and seizures that are 'unreasonable."').
117. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that examination of
home with thermal imager constitutes search and is presumptively unreasonable
without warrant); Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Fourth
Amendment "does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant"); Chimel v.
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Nor are warrants intended to provide any notice to the target of the
search or seizure.118 The "reasonableness" theory seems to conceive of
warrants as a way for judges to supervise policework, as it excuses
them when police act "reasonably" without one.119 Some searches are
reasonable without probable cause, while others never are,
depending on whether privacy interests outweigh government
objectives.120 In other words, the "reasonableness" theory evaluates
every search with the balancing test that the "warrant preference"
theory reserves for "special needs" cases.121
Neither theory is internally consistent and neither leads to
predictable results.22 The "warrant preference" theory fails to
provide criteria for assessing the large majority of searches, those
that are outside the "general" rule requiring warrants supported by
probable cause. The "reasonableness" theory offers no textual or
principled explanation for why a warrant or probable cause is ever
required in the absence of a statute.123
The opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens show that the
theories differ more in rhetoric than in result, which obfuscates the
crucial points on which they do diverge. Far from defending
conservative and liberal viewpoints, as commentators routinely
suppose, the opinions of Justices Scalia and Stevens reflect the
California, 395 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that Fourth
Amendment "does not proscribe 'warrantless searches' but instead it proscribes
'unreasonable searches' and this Court has never held nor does the majority today
assert that warrantless searches are necessarily unreasonable"); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967) (White, J., concurring) (stating that "on the record
now before us the particular surveillance undertaken was unreasonable absent a
warrant properly authorizing it"); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925)
(framing issue as whether warrantless search of automobile was nonetheless
reasonable under Fourth Amendment).
118. See Grubbs v. United States, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 562 (2004).
119. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177 (1990).
120. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), with Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987). Discussing Hicks, Professors Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman
separate the issue of whether a search is reasonable from whether it is supported by
probable cause; they claim the Court did not discuss whether the search was
reasonable but focused only on whether it was supported by probable cause.
Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 23. Hicks, however, holds that the
particular search at issue was not reasonable without probable cause because it
occurred in a home. 480 U.S. at 327-28.
121. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
122. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 48 ("[I]ndividualized,
retrospective balancing provides little prospective direction to police officers, who
presumably need clear rules to guide their decisions.").
123. Invoking the common law at the time of adoption is unavailing, as the Framers
did not intend the Amendment to reach all searches and seizures.
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debate over the two principal interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment.124 Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens adhere
consistently to the "reasonableness" theory and the "warrant
preference" theory respectively. As a result, their opinions and votes
offer a convenient, if rough, comparison between the two
approaches.125 In contrast, the opinions of some other Justices are
not similarly constant. Justice O'Connor, for example, frustratingly
decided the legality of every given search on its idiosyncratic
details.126 Notably, many of the modern search cases in which neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice Stevens joined the majority (or plurality)
opinion were decided expressly on policy grounds or through a
rudderless, ad hoc approach.127
124. Characterizing Justice Scalia as a law-and-order conservative and Justice
Stevens as a champion of liberty does not explain, for example, why Justice Scalia
wrote the Court's opinion in Kyllo, disapproving the challenged search over Justice
Stevens's strident dissent.
125. There was a purer version of the "warrant preference" theory than that
described in Justice Stevens's opinions. That version maintained that, although
"exigent circumstances" can excuse the need to obtain a warrant before undertaking a
search, there must always be probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-36
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,
as well as those of Justice Douglas, reflected that view to varying degrees. However,
Terry acknowledged that the pure "warrant preference" theory was unworkable. Since
then, the Court has allowed ever more searches without probable cause by expanding
the "Terry stop" and "special needs" categories. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). Justice Stevens's version of "warrant preference," for better
or worse, is the one with continuing, if waning, vitality.
126. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38, 44 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional checkpoint "whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing' but stating that checkpoint to catch terrorist or
dangerous criminal would be legal); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 333 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating allowing "cursory inspections" of objects as
distinguished from "full-blown searches"); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718
(1987) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that "the question whether an
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case
basis").
127. Cases decided on policy grounds include Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 622-23 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("The need for a clear rule, readily understood by
police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not
within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort of
generalization which Belton enunciated."); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574
(1991) (Blackmun, J.) ("[B]y attempting to distinguish between a container for which
the police are specifically searching and a container which they come across in a car,
we have provided only minimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law
enforcement."); and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
679 (1989) (Kennedy, J.) ('The Government's compelling interests in preventing the
promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of our
Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interests of those who
seek promotion to these positions, who enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by
virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions.").
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This comparison reveals that the theories differ primarily in two
respects: the importance they accord individualized suspicion, which
is the one thing the Framers certainly did mean to address, and the
purpose they assume search warrants serve. Despite these
differences, neither approach is satisfactory. Neither theory
introduces any intellectual discipline to the process of assessing
privacy expectations and balancing them against claimed
government needs. Nor does either theory offer any help in deciding
cases that turn on what exactly constitutes a "search" or on the
meaning of other terms in the Amendment. Neither theory has a
sensible conception of the role warrants play in protecting rights.
Owing to its many exceptions, the "warrant preference" theory only
rarely requires a warrant when the "reasonableness" theory would
dispense with one.128
A. Competing Views on Expectations of Privacy
In April 2002, the Broward County Sheriffs Office received an
anonymous tip that James Rabb was growing marijuana in his
house. Four days later, deputies watched Mr. Rabb leave his house
and drive north on 1-95. They stopped him for making an improper
lane change, ordered him out of his car, and walked a drug-sniffing
dog around it.129
After the dog alerted, the deputies had it sniff the car's interior.
The dog, according to the deputies, indicated there were drugs in the
ashtray. The officers found a joint there and arrested Mr. Rabb,
whose sock contained two more joints. The deputies then took the dog
to Mr. Rabb's house and pushed him to the front door, where he
again alerted. The deputies claimed they too could smell marijuana
while standing at the front door. Based on this information, a judge
Cases decided on an ad hoc basis, articulating no standard, include Minnesota v.
Carter, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("If we regard the overnight guest...
as typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home
of another, and one merely 'legitimately on the premises' as typifying those who may
not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in between.") and O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) ("Given the great
variety of work environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.").
128. One reason for this is that both theories generally require a warrant to search
a house. Another reason is that most searches are within one of the "warrant
preference" theory's many exceptions to the warrant requirement.
129. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). It is
constitutional for police to order drivers stopped for a traffic infraction out of their
cars, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977), and to use minor traffic
infractions as pretexts to check cars for drugs, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
813 (1996).
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issued a warrant to search the house. In it, police found sixty-four
marijuana plants. 130
The trial court granted Mr. Rabb's motion to suppress the
plants,131 and the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed,
reasoning that the dog sniff at the door of the house was an
unconstitutional, warrantless search.132 The appellate court further
held that there was insufficient evidence without the illegal dog sniff
to establish probable cause, invalidating the subsequent search
inside the house.133 The United States Supreme Court remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of Illinois v. Caballes.134 That case
held that a dog sniff of a car stopped for a traffic infraction was not a
Fourth Amendment "search" as long as the sniff did not prolong the
stop or reveal anything but the presence of contraband.135
On remand, the Florida court undertook to determine whether
the dog sniff violated a "constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy."36 Though the Supreme Court had twice held
that dog sniffs are not Fourth Amendment "searches,"37 the Florida
court also had to consider other Supreme Court cases providing near-
categorical protection to homes. Most pertinent of these was Kyllo v.
United States, another growhouse case, which held: "In the home, our
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is
held safe from prying government eyes."138 Danny Lee Kyllo
challenged federal agents' use of a thermal imaging device to
measure the relative heat emanating from his home.139 Based on that
and an informant's tip, the agents obtained a warrant, searched the
home, and uncovered more than one hundred plants.140 The Supreme
Court held that scanning the home with a thermal imaging device
130. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1179.
131. State v. Rabb, 881 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
132. Id. at 595.
133. Id. at 595-96.
134. Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005).
135. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). Elsewhere, I have argued that
Caballes was wrongly decided. Bascuas, supra note 113, at 776. The case is premised
on the notion that "the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the
highway was based on probable cause." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. However, there can
never be probable cause to believe a civil traffic infraction has occurred because the
term "probable cause" in the Fourth Amendment refers only and specifically to a belief
that criminal activity has occurred. Bascuas, supra note 113, at 776.
136. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
137. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
138. 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
139. Id. at 29-30.
140. Id. at 30.
2008] PROPERTY AND PROBABLE CAUSE
was an unconstitutional search.141 Disclaiming any conflict with
Kyllo, Caballes held that contraband is never legitimately private.142
Given these two absolute propositions-that homes are always
private and that drugs are never private-the Florida court was
understandably confounded by whether a dog sniff of a house was
constitutional.143 The deciding factor had to be either that the drugs
were in a house or that the dog sniff could detect only contraband.144
The majority went with the former rationale:
[I]t is of no importance that a dog sniff provides limited
information regarding only the presence or absence of
contraband, because as in Kyllo, the quality or quantity of
information obtained through the search is not the feared
injury. Rather, it is the fact that law enforcement endeavored to
obtain the information from inside the house at all, or in this
case, the fact that a dog's sense of smell crossed the "firm line"
of Fourth Amendment protection at the door of Rabb's house.145
141. Id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previous have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.").
142. 543 U.S. at 409-10. ('The legitimate expectation that information about
perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from
respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the
trunk of his car.").
143. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
144. The court correctly perceived that to be the choice required by the Supreme
Court's muddled jurisprudence: "[I]n order to determine whether a search has
occurred, we determine whether the place at which the search occurred was subject to
a legitimate expectation of privacy while the dissent measures whether the item
searched for was subject to a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 1190.
145. Id. at 1184. The court held that houses are virtually unique, distinguishing
another Florida appellate case, Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004), which approved a dog sniff of a hotel room on this basis:
Put simply, we view the reasonable expectation of privacy afforded to
locations along a hierarchy from public to private. An airport and a highway
are unquestionably public places with little or no privacy, as much as a home
is undoubtedly a private place characterized by its very privacy. A hotel room
lies somewhere in between, because although it possesses some of the
aspects of a home, it also possesses some of the aspects of the itinerant life
present in airports and on highways. An individual expects the public to be
readily present in the hallways outside a hotel room door, but an individual
does not expect the public to be readily present on the porch outside the door
to a home.
Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1186-87. Although it stopped short of saying so, the court
apparently did not believe that the officers smelled marijuana, or at least did not
believe that they would have smelled it had the dog not first alerted. Id at 1191. The
dissenting judge criticized the majority for ignoring that the officers averred that they
smelled marijuana, arguing that the officers could legally walk up to the front door
and inhale. Id at 1194-95 (Gross, J., dissenting).
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From all appearances, the police investigating Mr. Rabb went to
considerable pains to comply with a jumble of Supreme Court
pronouncements on how constitutionally to proceed. In the end, an
appellate court determined that the police got it wrong, despite their
having obtained a warrant before entering the house and despite the
fact that even judges who pondered the case for years could not agree
on what the Constitution required. As Rabb illustrates, one
fundamental problem with current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is that Katz's "expectations of privacy" analysis is
inherently subjective. It will always yield an arbitrary and
unpredictable answer to whether a given action amounts to a
"search" that violates a "legitimate" privacy expectation.
1. Defining "Searches"
Because both Fourth Amendment theories accept that the
Amendment protects privacy expectations, both must contend with
an extremely broad notion of what a "search" is. Rather than being
read as forbidding only unsupported, dragnet searches, the Fourth
Amendment is read under both the "reasonableness" and "warrant
preference" theories as an edict regulating every government
invasion of privacy.146 This broad understanding of "search" is a
desirable check on government power, but it requires some principled
manner of limiting the scope of the term to avoid absurdity. A
privacy-based interpretation supplies no limiting principle as to what
constitutes a "search," which could include even merely observing
someone.147 Although the Court has limited the type of privacy
receiving Fourth Amendment protection, neither of the two Fourth
Amendment theories provided a principled means for doing so.
In cases requiring the Court to determine whether a given
government action was a Fourth Amendment "search," the two
theories, judging from the opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia,
are about as likely to diverge as not. For example, these two Justices
agreed in Arizona v. Hicks that police officers who entered an
apartment to investigate a shooting effected a Fourth Amendment
146. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (describing Katz as holding that
"capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place"); see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727
(1993).
147. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) ("[W]e have held that visual
observation is no 'search' at all .... "). But see Amar, supra note 39, at 1102 (arguing
that officer's watching person walk on public sidewalk constituted Fourth Amendment
"search").
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"search" by lifting and turning expensive stereo equipment to read
and copy serial numbers.14s They further agreed that the search was
unconstitutional.149 In another case, however, they disagreed about
whether a public hospital's reporting to police that pregnant patients'
urine samples revealed crack cocaine use was a "search."150 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded these actions "were
indisputably searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."151 Justice Scalia insisted in dissent that they were
not.152 That same year, the Justices swapped positions over whether
using a thermal imager to measure the relative amount of heat
emanating from a home amounted to a "search."153 That time, Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion holding that the challenged action
was a search because it revealed information about the inside of a
home.154 Justice Stevens insisted in dissent that monitoring
emissions outside a house was no more a search of the house than
looking at it.155
In each case where it was contended that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply because no search occurred, the Justices
could rely on nothing but their own common sense or personal views
on privacy to decide the question. As the cases illustrate, whether
privacy is invaded may depend upon whether personal information is
uncovered, whether possessions are touched or moved, whether
information from inside a home or other particular location is
discovered, or whether intrusive means were used to obtain
information. None of these approaches is manifestly superior to the
others. Neither Fourth Amendment theory can resolve this.
Similarly, the two theories had no impact in cases requiring
another word in the Amendment's text to be defined. Minnesota v.
148. 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987). Analogously, Justices Scalia and Stevens joined
the entire Court in holding that a sheriffs moving a trailer home without legal cause
was an unconstitutional "seizure," notwithstanding the fact that no search occurred.
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61-62, 73 (1992).
149. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325-27. Justice Scalia's majority opinion justifies the
outcome with reasons that satisfy each theory's criteria. The search was illegal under
the "warrant preference" theory because it was unrelated to the exigent circumstance
that justified the warrantless intrusion. Id. The search failed under the
"reasonableness" theory because searches inside a home are unreasonable unless
supported by probable cause. Id.
150. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
151. Id. at 76.
152. Id. at 93 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Alternatively, Justice Scalia contended
that, if examining the women's urine were a search, the "warrant preference" theory's
"special needs" framework would allow it. Id. at 98.
153. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
154. Id. at 40.
155. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Carter asked whether a person could object to the search of an
apartment where he was present as a mere visitor..156 Justice Scalia
wrote in a concurrence that the challenge could not be maintained
because he construed the word "their" in the Amendment as
protecting people only in 'their respective houses."'157 Justice
Stevens signed Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which applied the Katz
test to conclude that a visitor has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his host's home, implying that "their" has a communal meaning.158
In Wyoming v. Houghton,159 Justice Scalia held for the Court that
"probable cause" to believe an automobile contains contraband
entails probable cause to search every container in it.160 Justice
Stevens dissented, believing that probable cause is specific for each
container or package in the car.1 61 On the other hand, Justices Scalia
and Stevens agreed in Whren v. United States162 that "probable
cause" connotes a purely objective inquiry, allowing police officers to
stop drivers by using traffic infractions as pretexts for drug
interdiction.163 The Justices define such terms, just as they define
"searches," with an irresolvable back-and-forth about the legitimacy
of claimed privacy expectations.
It is not difficult to see where the Supreme Court's privacy-based
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence went off the rails. In United States
v. Miller,164 the Court held that a depositor's bank records were not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court distinguished Boyd
on a property basis, stating that the depositor could "assert neither
ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business records of
the bank."165 The Court went on to hold that Katz also did not apply,
156. 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
157. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 107-08 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
159. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
160. Id. at 302 ("When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is
reasonable for police officers... to examine packages and containers without a
showing of individualized probable cause for each one.").
161. Id. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Whether or not the Fourth Amendment
required a warrant to search Houghton's purse, at the very least the trooper in this
case had to have probable cause to believe that her purse contained contraband.").
Justice Stevens's interpretation likely had better support before the ascent of privacy.
See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586 (1948) (disapproving search of person
over government's argument that search was necessary "in a case such as this where
the contraband sought is a small article which could easily be concealed on the
person").
162. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
163. Id. at 818.
164. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
165. Id. at 440.
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analogizing banks to confidential informants.166 Citing cases where
confidential informants or undercover agents testify against
defendants, the Court reasoned:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed. 167
This superficial comparison has been taken to augur that any
information shared with another entity loses constitutional
protection because it is no longer private.168 In Smith v. Maryland,169
the Court expanded Miller's reasoning to hold that whom people call
on the telephone is not private information:
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that
the phone company does in fact record this information for a
variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances,
harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will
remain secret. 170
Illustrating that the Katz test is unworkable because Supreme
Court majorities are often out of touch with what the public expects
166. See id. at 442-43.
167. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that
conversations with bugged informant were not protected by Fourth Amendment);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that use of defendant's
conversations with informant did not violate Fourth Amendment); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (holding that use of undercover agent's testimony did not
violate Fourth Amendment)).
168. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For
an extensive analysis of the Court's "knowing exposure" cases, see Sherry F. Colb,
What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some
Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002).
169. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
170. Id. at 743. In dissent, Justice Marshall reiterated the position he had staked
out in Miller and subsequent cases that information conveyed to a service provider did
not cease to be private: "Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company
for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released
to other persons for other purposes." Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart also dissented but on the more narrow ground that the numbers
dialed were indistinguishable from the conversation held private in Katz. Id. at 746-47
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 'What the telephone company does or might do with those
numbers is no more relevant to this inquiry than it would be in a case involving the
conversation itself." Id. at 747.
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to remain private, Congress enacted legislation limiting the effects of
both decisions. In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Financial
Privacy Act, essentially overturning Miller.171 In 1986, Congress
required that the government obtain a court order to obtain dialed
numbers but required a showing weaker than the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause standard.172 Subsequent legislation,
notably the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of
1994173 and the Stored Communications Act of 1986,174 further
refined the requirements for various types of electronic and wire
surveillance. Miller and Smith have left courts struggling to
understand how to apply these statutes to government demands in a
rapidly changing technological environment and to wonder how the
Fourth Amendment fits with them.175
Without a concrete and consistent value in the light of which to
understand the Fourth Amendment's terms, their meaning is
dependent on the personalities deciding disputes. When the
Amendment is understood to protect something as vague and hard to
discern as privacy in the abstract, it is impossible for a prosecutor or
a police officer to know whether a given act will later be deemed legal
by judges. In Rabb, police officers relied on Supreme Court precedent
that held a dog sniff is not a Fourth Amendment "search," only to
have their case undone years later by competing precedent saying
everything inside a house is private. As long as privacy remains the
Amendment's core value, its protection will remain forever hazy and
doubtful to police and citizens alike.
2. Balancing "Expectations of Privacy" and Government
"Needs"
Aiming the Fourth Amendment at privacy expectations provides
a rationalization for justifying the very harm that most concerned
the Framers: general, suspicionless searches. Both theories resort to
limiting privacy's vast reach by making pragmatic concessions to
171. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006).
172. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006); see also In re Application of the U.S., 515 F.
Supp. 2d 325, 328-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
173. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (requiring telecommunications
carriers to assist law enforcement with surveillance).
174. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986).
175. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S., 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81-82 (D. Mass.
2007) (holding that statutes provided that government could obtain cellular telephone
tracking information without probable cause); In re Applications of the U.S., 515 F.
Supp. 2d at 336 (holding that technology has undermined Smith's rationale regarding
dialed numbers); In re Application of the U.S., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(reviewing statutes and determining that disclosure of cellular phone tracking
information without probable cause was authorized).
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government claims of necessity, allowing in some cases random,
suspicionless searches for no better reason than expedience. Perhaps
the most significant difference between the prevailing theories is how
readily they dispense with individualized criminal suspicion. The
"warrant preference" theory dispenses with probable cause for Terry
stops and so-called "special needs" searches, a bizarre category of
searches justified by anything "other than the normal need for law
enforcement."176 Proceeding from the unsupported premise that
"unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment is a colloquial plea for
good sense and moderation, the "reasonableness" theory invites
balancing in any case. 177 Regardless of the theory employed, cases
decided through balancing-weighing judges' estimation of privacy
interests against the government's claimed reason for searching-
make for harrowing reading.
Neither theory offers (or can offer) any guidance to the
adjudicative free-for-all that is balancing.178 Balancing has proven to
be unconstrained by logic or evidence. Whether a given privacy
expectation receives protection is a matter of judges' personal
opinions and suppositions, rendering balancing utterly indefensible
as a mode of adjudicating searches. As Justice Scalia has observed,
balancing is for judges "a regrettable concession of defeat-an
acknowledgment that we have passed the point where 'law,' properly
speaking, has any further application."179
In cases decided by balancing, Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia
were more likely to agree when the challenged search was supported
by some individualized suspicion. For example, they agreed that the
government could search a probationer on reasonable suspicion.1SO
Both Justices signed Justice White's opinion for the Court in
California v. Greenwood,181 which approved of police searching
through a suspect's garbage without a warrant. The Court reasoned
that American society does not generally expect that garbage left on
the curb for collection will remain private.182 Justices Scalia and
176. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001).
177. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 86, at 923 (stating that use of "unreasonable"
suggests that Fourth Amendment requires balancing "individual interests against law
enforcement needs").
178. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 22 ("On some occasions, the Court
uses a rigid, formal structure for fourth amendment analysis.... On other occasions,
for reasons that are never made clear, the Court abandons this formal approach and
instead employs a free-wheeling, fact-specific balancing of costs and benefits.").
179. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1182 (1989).
180. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
181. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
182. Oblivious to the absurdity of the decision and ignoring that judges are not
representative of society, Justice White confidently chided the dissenting Justices for
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Stevens also both believed that the government's interest in
determining the cause of railway accidents justified drug testing
railroad employees.183 Joined by only Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia's
dissent in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab stated
that the government had not shown a sufficiently compelling "social
necessity" to justify randomly drug testing certain U.S. Customs
Service agents.184 (Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented
separately, arguing that balancing was unnecessary because drug
testing without probable cause is always unconstitutional.185)
However, both considered sniffs of cars by drug dogs to be
categorically exempt from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Justice
Scalia joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Illinois v.
Caballes,186 which held that police could have a drug dog sniff a car
during a traffic stop so long as the sniffing did not prolong the stop.
The Court reasoned that the driver had no legitimate interest in
concealing the presence of contraband in his car.18 7
Justices Stevens and Scalia often balanced differently, however,
showing how Katz's rejection of property makes it possible to require
or dispense with individualized suspicion on the basis of only the
Justices' own political or social intuitions. In O'Connor v. Ortega, for
example, the Court held that the government was justified in
searching its employees' offices without probable cause by the
"special need" of administering agencies.188 Justice Scalia concurred,
contending that the government could search as employer even when
it might not be able to as law enforcer.189 The dissenting Justices,
including Justice Stevens, believed no "special need" existed and so
the search required probable cause and a warrant.19o
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia opined in another case that
students playing sports had a "negligible" privacy interest in their
disagreeing: "Given that the dissenters are among the tiny minority of judges whose
views are contrary to ours, we are distinctly unimpressed with the dissent's prediction
that 'society will be shocked to learn' of today's decision." Id. at 43 n.5 (quoting id. at
46 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
183. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989); id. at 634
(Stevens, J., concurring).
184. 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's opinion in the
present case, however, will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that
will be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees.").
185. Id. at 679-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This opinion reflects the "purer"
"warrant preference" theory alluded to earlier.
186. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
187. Id. at 408-09.
188. 480 U.S. 707, 725 (1987) (plurality opinion).
189. Id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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urine, which the school district could therefore drug test.191 The
reasoning offered in support of this was as outlandish as the
conclusion itself. Conceding that "collecting the samples for
urinalysis intrudes upon 'an excretory function traditionally shielded
by great privacy,"'192 the majority posited that athletes are
necessarily less inhibited about excreting than nonathletes. "School
sports are not for the bashful. They require 'suiting up' before each
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards."193 From
that claim, the majority deduced that the composition of athletes'
urine is not very private. Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by
Justice Stevens, decried the dragnet nature of the searches
authorized by the Court. 194
A few years later, the Court held that the interest of a student
participating in any extracurricular activity in not being randomly
tested for drugs was "not significant."195 Scrupulously noting that
urination remains a private excretory function, Justice Thomas's
majority opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, assured readers that
taking urine samples from schoolchildren was both "minimally
intrusive" and "reasonably effective" at deterring drug use. 196
Because extracurricular activities are extensively "regulated,"
students engaging in them cannot reasonably expect much privacy,
as they sometimes travel together and change clothes.197 Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, which Justice Stevens signed, seemed to sound a
personal note, arguing that nonathletic activities appeal to "the
modest and shy along with the bold and uninhibited."198 These
activities help build self-esteem, are part of the educational program,
and involve students least likely to do drugs, she argued.199 The
dissent thought it noteworthy that some choir members at the
district in question had devised a way to change into their choir
uniforms without being seen. 200 (Justice Breyer concurred only to
lament the "serious national problem" of student drug use,
191. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
192. Id. at 658 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626
(1989)).
193. Id. at 657.
194. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
196. Id. at 834, 837. Because the school failed to demonstrate that it was combating
a serious drug problem, id. at 827, it is unclear whether or how Justice Scalia's
position in Earls can be squared with his dissent in Von Raab.
197. Id. at 831-32.
198. Id. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 843-46.
200. Id. at 848 n.1.
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emphasizing the primacy of political considerations in Fourth
Amendment balancing.201)
Perhaps the most glaring illustration of how privacy
expectations can be used to prioritize expedience over rights is
Samson v. California.202 Justice Thomas's majority opinion in that
case, joined by Justice Scalia, held that parolees could be searched
with no warrant and with no suspicion of wrongdoing whatsoever.203
Knowing that Donald Samson was on parole, a police officer stopped
Samson as he walked along a sidewalk.204 The Court starkly
presented the facts: "[B]ased solely on petitioner's status as a
parolee, Officer Rohleder searched petitioner."205 Nonetheless, the
search was "reasonable" because parolees do "not have an
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate."206
Justice Stevens protested that the Court had held "for the first time,
that a search supported by neither individualized suspicion nor
'special needs' is nonetheless 'reasonable."'207
The Court's cases concerning roadway checkpoints further
evidence how privacy expectations devalue the Framers' concern for
individualized suspicion. Over Justice Stevens's contention that
surprise, nighttime checkpoints are the hallmark of totalitarian
regimes and are ineffective at curbing drunk-driving fatalities,20s
Justice Scalia joined a majority holding that checkpoints for drunk
driving are minimally intrusive.209 A decade later, Justice Stevens
joined a majority holding that drug interdiction checkpoints were
unconstitutional while Justice Scalia joined a dissent characterizing
them as minimally intrusive.210 In another case, the Court held that
stopping motorists to inquire about a week-old hit-and-run accident
was not "onerous" and therefore not unconstitutional.211 Justice
Stevens argued that motorists might well find such a stop "annoying"
or even "alarming."212 Interestingly, Justice Thomas, abandoning his
typical adherence to the "reasonableness" theory, alone maintained
201. Id. at 838 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
203. Id. at 846.
204. Id. at 846-47.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 852.
207. Id. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 462, 468-69 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 451-53 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
210. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000).
211. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004).
212. Id. at 428-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that roadblocks are always unconstitutional because they are
precisely the sort of dragnet search the Framers sought to bar.213
Of course, the constitutionality of highway searches and seizures
should not depend on how much judges imagine a typical driver will
mind the intrusion. If the First Amendment were interpreted in
accordance with what most people would not mind-or, more
precisely, what judges thought most people would not mind-it would
be an easy thing to outlaw blighting forms of communication14 and
many forms of political dissent.215 Asking whether government policy
objectives (or, more melodramatically, government needs) outweigh
individual rights injects into Fourth Amendment adjudication the
hidden premise that the Constitution should, whenever possible,
accommodate the government. If Congress outlaws drug possession,
balancing itself invites the Court to construe the Fourth Amendment
so as to make that law enforceable.216 In other words, balancing asks
each Justice to decide not whether a search violates rights but
whether the privacy of the affected group is more valuable to society
than the search's utility. Fourth Amendment balancing is
tantamount to reviewing law enforcement practices for both wisdom
and efficacy. The painfully discursive rationales deployed in
balancing show how wanting for legal principles Fourth Amendment
theory is.
B. Competing Views on the Purpose of Warrants
On the evening of Saturday, May 20, 2006, about fifteen FBI
agents arrived at the Rayburn House Office Building with a warrant
to search the office of Louisiana Representative William J.
213. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). How his position could be
reconciled with his opinion for the Court in Earls is something of a mystery.
214. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (holding unconstitutional
city ordinance prohibiting residential signs not falling into ten specified exceptions);
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) (holding
unconstitutional city ordinance outlawing rack for distribution of commercial handbills
as opposed to newspapers).
215. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding
unconstitutional state statute outlawing anonymous campaign literature).
216. Justice Stevens recently criticized such balancing when the result was to
permit a high school to punish a student for drug-related speech:
[In the Court's] view, the unusual importance of protecting children from the
scourge of drugs supports a ban on all speech in the school environment that
promotes drug use. Whether or not such a rule is sensible as a matter of
policy, carving out pro-drug speech for uniquely harsh treatment finds no
support in our case law and is inimical to the values protected by the First
Amendment.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2646 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Jefferson.217 It was the first time that law enforcement officers had
searched the official office of a member of Congress.218 The
Department of Justice did not give notice of the search to House
leadership, the House general counsel, or Congressman Jefferson.219
The media, however, was on hand to witness the event.220 The FBI
barred Congressman Jefferson, his counsel, House counsel, and the
Capitol police from the office during the search, which lasted
eighteen hours-from 7 p.m. Saturday until 1 p.m. Sunday.221 They
seized two boxes of documents and fourteen computer hard drives.222
Congressman Jefferson challenged the search by bringing a
motion for the return of everything seized from his office.223 He
argued that the search violated his legislative privilege and the
Fourth Amendment.224 The House supported Congressman
Jefferson's challenge, arguing that the search gravely threatened the
separation of powers. 225
The case was assigned to Chief Judge Thomas Hogan, who
rejected the Congressman's challenge after hearing argument but
taking no evidence.226 His decision was practically preordained, as
Judge Hogan himself had granted the Department of Justice's ex
parte request for the search warrant.227 Repeatedly characterizing
the judiciary as the "neutral" branch of government, Judge Hogan
emphasized that a judge's involvement-specifically his own-
217. See In re Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113, 432 F. Supp.
2d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2006), overruled in part by United States v. Rayburn House Office
Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Memorandum of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
In re Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (No. 06-231 M-01)
[hereinafter Bipartisan Memo].
218. Bipartisan Memo, supra note 217, at 1-2.
219. Id. at 6.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 6-7.
222. Id. at 7.
223. In re Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113, 432 F. Supp. 2d
100, 106 (D.D.C. 2006).
224. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Return of Property at 8, 18, In re
Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (No. 06-231 M-01).
225. See generally Bipartisan Memo, supra note 217. For background on the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group and the House Office of General Counsel, see Paul
Von Zielbauer, Little Office Becomes Big Player After Raid by the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2006, at A28.
226. See In re Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 119;
Shailagh Murray & Allan Lengel, Jefferson Loses Ways and Means Seat, WASH. POST,
June 17, 2006, at A07.
227. See Murray & Lengel, supra note 226; Kate Phillips, 2 Arms of Government
Wrestle in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2006, at All.
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afforded Congressman Jefferson and the legislative branch sufficient
protection from any overreaching by the executive branch:
[T]his Court intervened here with the neutral authority of the
third branch as a check on the power sought to be exerted by
the Executive Branch when it authorized a particularized
search warrant only upon a showing of probable cause. The
statement by amicus that if the search here is upheld, in the
future the Government need only to persuade a federal judge to
obtain warrants to search other congressional offices, is a gross
trivialization of the role of the judiciary. A federal judge is not a
mere rubber stamp in the warrant process, but rather an
independent and neutral official sworn to uphold and defend
the Constitution.228
Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom epitomized by Judge
Hogan's indignant if not defensive invective, the warrant process did
not provide Congressman Jefferson much protection. The question of
whether the government had a good reason for searching his office
was conclusively resolved secretly and beforehand by the prosecutors
and the judge. Though the judge doubtlessly gave this unprecedented
search more attention than most, it is safe to assume, as the House
counsel did, that a reviewing judge typically functions much like "a
mere rubber stamp," if only because of constraints inherent in the
process. As with every warrant application, the judge had only the
representations of the FBI agents and the Department of Justice
lawyers upon which to rely. Once Judge Hogan granted the warrant,
the matter of whether the circumstances justified a search was
essentially closed. The only available Fourth Amendment arguments
were that the warrant was defective in some way or that the search
was executed in an unreasonable manner.
The warrant being apparently in proper form, Congressman
Jefferson could complain only that he and his attorney were kept out
of his office during the search. Relying on a recent Supreme Court
decision, Judge Hogan rejected the argument because the
Congressman had no right to be present during the search.229
Affirming his initial decision to grant the warrant before hearing
228. In re Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
Subsequently, Judge Hogan denied Congressman Jefferson's request for a stay of the
order, which would have prevented the Department of Justice from reviewing the
seized materials until an appeal was decided. See In re Search of Rayburn House
Office Bldg. Room No. 2113, 434 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 (D.D.C. 2006). Because of the serious
separation-of-powers ramifications, the D.C. Circuit enjoined the Department of
Justice from reviewing the seized materials. It ordered that Congressman Jefferson
must first be allowed to review the materials, assert specific claims of legislative
privilege, and have Judge Hogan rule on his claims. See id.
229. See In re Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18
(citing United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006)).
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from the Congressman or the House, Judge Hogan noted that the
search was "reasonable under the Fourth Amendment" because the
government's "need to conduct the search" outweighed whatever
"invasion" it entailed.230 As with many decisions regarding whether a
search was legal at the outset, the ruling's rationale is not
particularly clear. Judge Hogan purported to balance the
government's "need" for evidence against the Congressman's interest
without specifying the gravity of the need or the nature of the
interest. The House's asserted institutional interest in the incident
went unmentioned.
Once it is determined that a challenged search impacts a
"legitimate" privacy concern, it must be decided whether the
Amendment permits the government to undertake the search. The
Supreme Court has made this inordinately difficult for even lawyers
to discern. Despite Judge Hogan's words on the important
contribution that the "neutral" judicial branch makes by authorizing
searches in advance, the celebrated warrant requirement is "more
honour'd in the breach than the observance."231 The number of
searches made pursuant to an exception to the warrant rule is many
times the number made under a warrant's authority.232 Likewise,
exceptions to the warrant rule, which used to be described as "few in
number and carefully delineated"233 and "jealously and carefully
drawn,"234 have swelled substantially in both number and scope,
contributing to confusion in the law.235 As was true forty years ago
about another facet of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the warrant requirement "has spawned exceptions so numerous and
confusion so great, in fact, that it is questionable whether it affords
meaningful protection."236
The "warrant preference" theory favors repair to a magistrate for
a warrant somewhat more often than the "reasonableness" theory.
However, this disparity is rooted in conflicting, anachronistic
230. See id. at 118.
231. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 4.
232. TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 48 ("I]t is abundantly apparent that searches of
persons and premises incident to an arrest outnumber manyfold searches covered by
warrants.").
233. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
234. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); accord United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 960-61 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 573 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(describing warrant exceptions as "confusing jurisprudence"); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing twenty-two exceptions to the
warrant rule); Texas v. Brown 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983) (cataloguing cases
illustrating "wide range of diverse situations" in which warrant requirement is
excused).
236. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967) (discussing "mere evidence" rule).
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perspectives on the purposes search warrants serve. In other words,
the theories disagree on the very concept of a modern "warrant."
Neither theory's explanation of what warrants provide is ultimately
convincing. Search warrants under current law offer very little, if
any, benefit to the target of a search.
In California v. Acevedo, police watched Charles Acevedo enter
an apartment building known to contain marijuana.237 While the lead
officer went to get a search warrant to search the apartment,
Acevedo walked out carrying a paper bag, got into a car, and began to
drive away. 238 The police stopped his car, opened the trunk and the
paper bag in it, and found marijuana.239 Justice Scalia agreed with
the majority that no warrant was necessary to open the bag.240 He
also, however, agreed with Justice Stevens that it was anomalous to
require a warrant to search the bag while Acevedo was walking with
it but to dispense with a warrant once Acevedo put the bag in his
car. 241 Justice Stevens would have required the police to observe the
"general rule" and obtain a warrant. 242 Justice Scalia believed it was
"reasonable" to search the bag, as the "general rule" is general in
name only.243
Whether to require a warrant in Acevedo hinges on whether
warrants are meant to deter only intentional constitutional violations
or inadvertent transgressions as well. If warrants are to keep the
police only from deliberately making an unjustified search, a warrant
was hardly necessary. The police doubtlessly had probable cause to
search the bag, and precedent clearly allowed the search of the
trunk. There is no hint that the police did anything to circumvent the
letter or spirit of the Fourth Amendment. The majority opinion thus
seems to posit that complicating matters for well-meaning officers
(who, after all, the opinion gratuitously notes, sought a warrant for
the apartment) serves no purpose. If, however, as the dissenting
Justices believed, resort to a magistrate serves to ensure that people
are not searched without probable cause even by well-meaning police,
then requiring a warrant made at least some sense. 244
237. 500 U.S. 565, 567 (1991).
238. Id. at 567 & n.1.
239. Id. at 567.
240. Id. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 584-85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe chief deterrent function of the [exclusionary] rule is its tendency to promote
institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part of law
enforcement agencies generally.").
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The same difference in understanding divided Justices Scalia
and Stevens over the poorly reasoned "consent exception" to the
warrant requirement. In Illinois v. Rodriguez,245 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, stated that when police enter a home with
the consent of one seemingly authorized to admit them, the entry is
constitutionally "reasonable" despite the mistake.246 Conceptualizing
consent as a waiver of rights that can be made only with actual
authority, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Stevens and Brennan,
deemed the warrantless intrusion unconstitutional.247
Rodriguez reveals more starkly than Acevedo a disagreement
between the theoretical camps over the purpose of warrants. Placing
the burden on police to ensure that consent is actually, not merely
apparently, valid makes little sense if exclusion of evidence is a
punitive sanction. If the police have good reason to believe they are
welcome into a place, punishing them if by some fluke they are wrong
is pointless. However, the dissenters in Rodriguez would suppress
evidence not to punish the police but to vindicate Edward Rodriguez's
privacy right. Burdening the police with getting a warrant whenever
possible, despite apparent consent, makes sense if warrants are
meant to minimize even innocent mistakes and
misunderstandings.248
The "consent exception" itself is built on the "reasonableness"
theory's premise that the warrant and probable cause requirements
needlessly hamper well-intentioned police. In approving it, the Court
professed to strike an "accommodation" between the government's
desire to investigate suspicious people and the right of those people
to not be bothered.249 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court held
that consent to search an automobile could be voluntary even though
police did not inform the driver of his right to refuse.250 The
astounding rationale was that giving notice (although the FBI had
245. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
246. Id. at 186. Although the police entered Edward Rodriguez's apartment to
arrest him for assaulting his girlfriend rather than to search for anything, the holding
applies equally to entries made to effect a search.
247. Id. at 198 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
248. Of course, for reasons discussed supra, it is doubtful that the warrant process
does much to prevent mistakes. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct.
1989 (2007) (holding that police executed search warrant reasonably though house had
been sold three months earlier, occupants were of different race than targets, and
police held naked couple at gunpoint); Eric Lichtblau, Through an Error, F.B.I. Gained
Unauthorized Access to E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at Al (discussing how
Internet service provider mistakenly produced "far more data" than authorized by
judge).
249. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973).
250. Id. at 248-49.
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routinely done so for years251l) would make investigating certain
crimes impossible, particularly when the police had no good reason to
search: "In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit
activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining
important and reliable evidence."252
Assuming that to be the case, it does not explain why the police
should be able to intimidate or trick people into consenting to a
search.253 In other words, the Court expressly decided the
Constitution must allow police to exploit people's ignorance of their
rights (or fear of the police) to make unjustified (read "general")
searches.254 The Court has extended Schneckloth's reasoning and
held that a bus passenger's assent to three police officers' request to
search his luggage after they arrested his traveling companion was
voluntary.255
Not surprisingly, police exploit the consent rationale to randomly
search automobiles256 and even homes. In 2007, the Boston police
commissioner announced that police would go door-to-door in "high-
crime neighborhoods" and ask parents for consent to search
251. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 227 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
253. In this important regard, Schneckloth was a world away from the principal
authorities on which it relied to support the premise that Fourth Amendment rights
can be waived. Neither Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), nor Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), involved a "general, exploratory search." Both involved
searches of business premises during business hours of documents the government
had a property or contractual right to inspect. Davis, 328 U.S. at 592; Zap, 328 U.S. at
626-28. In Davis, the documents were gas ration coupons that the government owned.
328 U.S. at 592-93. In Zap, the documents were ledgers of a government contractor
whose contract with the government specifically granted the government a right to
inspect. Zap, 328 U.S. at 627-28. In neither case did the government "obtain access by
force, fraud, or trickery." Id. at 629.
254. As Justice Marshall's thoughtful dissent put it: "[A]Ill the police must do is
conduct what will inevitably be a charade of asking for consent. If they display any
firmness at all, a verbal expression of assent will undoubtedly be forthcoming."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197-200 (2002).
256. See Bascuas, supra note 113, at 761-69 (describing nationwide DEA-sponsored
operation to train state and local police to stop random drivers and obtain consent to
search for drugs). New Jersey denies officers the ability to leverage traffic stops into
consent searches. See, e.g., State v. Elders, 927 A.2d 1250, 1266 (N.J. 2007) (holding
that police may not request consent to search disabled vehicle without reasonable and
articulable suspicion that occupants are engaged in crime); State v. Carty, 790 A.2d
903, 912 (N.J. 2002), modified on other grounds, 806 A.2d 798 (2002) (holding that
police may not request consent to search legally stopped vehicle without reasonable
and articulable suspicion that occupants are engaged in crime). But see State v. Cox,
171 S.W.3d 174, 181 (Tenn. 2005) (declining to follow Carty).
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teenagers' rooms for guns. 257 Police in St. Louis had launched a
similar program in the late 1990s, which inspired police in other
cities to request authorization for similar dragnet sweeps.258
Although the Boston police promised that, in most cases, any guns or
drugs found would be confiscated without prosecution (likely to avoid
court challenge to the dragnet sweeps), they reserved the right to
prosecute depending on what was found.259 Newspapers in Boston
and St. Louis editorialized against the consent-based sweeps, citing
the potential for abuse and harassment.260
Interestingly, prior to Katz's break with property, the Court
understood that any display of firmness by officers would be
interpreted as a claim of right to search. In Amos v. United States,
the Court ordered the return of liquor seized in reliance on the
consent of the owner's wife to the search.261 The Court refused even
to consider whether the wife's consent to search her husband's
property would be valid.262 It summarily concluded that it was
"perfectly clear" that the agents' demand to search the house
amounted to "implied coercion."263
The most ill-considered outgrowth of the insidious idea that
warrants serve only to discourage deliberate police misconduct (i.e.,
to enable the courts to supervise policework) is the creation of the
"good faith" exception to exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon,264
the case adopting this exception, was decided before Justice Scalia's
257. Marcia Cramer, Police to Search for Guns in Homes; City Program Depends on
Parental Consent, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2007, at Al.
258. Id.; see also Mark Fritz, Going After Guns, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 1995, at 4B;
Carmenn Miles, Gang Members' Homes Targeted, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb.
26, 1996, at 7A; Winburn: Let Cops In To Hunt Guns, CINCINNATI POST, July 3, 1996,
at 18A.
259. See Editorial, A Questionable Search for Safety, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2007,
at 18A.
260. Id. ("[Obtaining consent] doesn't settle the question of why people would waive
their rights when it isn't clear what the legal effects might be on other family
members, or whether the seizure of other evidence might lead to criminal charges.");
Editorial, SCAT Walks A Fine Legal Line, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 1995, at
6B ("Police officials initially gave the impression that the program would target homes
where suspected gang members live or congregregate .... It now appears that the
program is much broader, aimed at any property where police suspect illegal
activities."); Editorial, Skirting the Constitution, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 25,
1994, at 6B ("The routine seems to be for an officer or officers to show up at a door and
tell the occupant that police have a tip that illegal guns might be inside. This is
followed by a request for permission to search the house. Police could use that excuse
to gain entry to any property or to harass individuals.").
261. 255 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1921).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 317.
264. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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appointment to the Court, so his position on this specific issue is
unknown.265 Justice White's majority opinion did, however, reflect a
"reasonableness" approach, reasoning that excluding evidence seized
under a facially valid warrant would not further the exclusionary
rule's purpose of deterring police misconduct.266 Justice Stevens
argued in dissent that a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant had
never been interpreted as a "guarantee that the ensuing search and
seizure is constitutionally reasonable."267 He also pointed out that the
exclusionary rule was grounded not only on a deterrence rationale
but also on a belief that courts could not admit unconstitutionally
seized evidence without becoming party to the violation.26s
Because the "reasonableness" theory implicitly but consistently
looks at warrants as a means for the judiciary to keep police from
misbehaving, it dispenses with a warrant when judicial oversight
seems unduly inefficient. The "warrant preference" theory sees
warrants as a useful bottleneck that allows a disinterested outsider
to inject sound judgment into government actions. Both theories
fatuously take it for granted that the process of obtaining a warrant
entails a burden on the police and efficacious participation by the
magistrate.
IV. CONCRETE FOURTH AMENDMENT VALUES: PROPERTY AND
PROBABLE CAUSE
Any Fourth Amendment theory that attempts to reach all
government searches must contend with the fact that the Framers
did not intend the Amendment to have such broad application.
Rather, they intended to bar the central government from
undertaking general searches without good cause, leaving most other
search and seizure issues to common law or statutory evolution.269
The legislature would decide when warrants were required, but
warrants could issue only on a showing of "probable cause." Even
today, nothing prevents Congress from statutorily requiring a
265. Justice Scalia joined the majority in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), which
extended Leon's "good faith" exception to a warrantless search incident to arrest made
because a court clerk failed to record the quashing of a bench warrant. Id. at 14-16. No
one argued in Evans that Leon should be overruled.
266. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.
267. Id. at 969.
268. Id. at 977-78.
269. See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203-04 (1926) (L. Hand, J.);
TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 41-43; Clancy, supra note 39, at 1040; Davies, supra note 39,
at 668-93.
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warrant that the Fourth Amendment is held not to require, for
example, to conduct searches at the border.270
That is not to say that the Fourth Amendment cannot or even
should not apply to school principals rummaging in students' purses
for cigarettes,271 staff members of a public hospital testing pregnant
women's urine for traces of crack,272 and police officers using a
homing device to track chemicals into houses.273 It is only to
emphasize the importance of choosing clear principles to guide courts
as they attempt to generalize the Framers' concerns and apply them
to present day challenges.24 Thus far, the Supreme Court has looked
in all the wrong places: "Indeed, because of the very different nature
and scope of federal authority and ability to conduct searches and
arrests at the founding, it is possible that neither the history of the
Fourth Amendment nor the common law provides much guidance."275
The Amendment's text is a good place to seek better guideposts.
A. The Pragmatic Protection of Property
The Fourth Amendment may protect privacy but it does not do
so by directing judges to enact into law their own personal instinct of
what society regards as private. In fact, this has proven to be a
particularly bad way to protect privacy. Asking judges to decide
whether society is prepared to endorse a claimed privacy expectation
politicizes the Fourth Amendment by forcing judges to guess in
essence whether most people276 would vote to respect the asserted
270. See United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 1984), vacated,
741 F.2d 1363, reinstated, 764 F.2d 747 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that 31
U.S.C. § 5317 required search warrants for border searches). Chemaly was superseded
by statute one month after it was decided. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 901(d), 98 Stat. 2135 (1985).
271. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985).
272. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 72 (2001).
273. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984).
274. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) ("What we do know is that
the Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the
Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the
specific abuses which gave it birth."); TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 15 ("To achieve its
basic purposes, however, the language 'must be capable of wider application than the
mischief [which gave] it birth."') (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910)); Maclin, supra note 112, at 7 (arguing that Fourth Amendment interpretation
should aim to discover the "broad themes" that animated Framers and apply them to
modern law enforcement innovations). But see Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 400
("[Tihe values which one finds in the history of the Bill of Rights are ineluctably one's
own").
275. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
276. That "people" in this inquiry embraces only as diverse a range of perspectives
as the ranks of the nation's judiciary is another grave problem embedded in the Katz
test. Reasoning that privacy can be bought, Professor Stuntz has made the related
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privacy expectation.277 As a result, it demeans the adjudicatory
process by requiring judges to answer a question that is inherently
legislative and irresoluble through adversary testing of evidence.
Unsurprisingly, nothing like a cohesive body of law has emerged.278
Rather, the Framers determined that the best way to protect
privacy was to protect property--"houses, papers and effects"-as
well as people from arbitrary government intrusions.279 Consistent
with this insight or instinct, many scholarly and juridical discussions
of the Amendment's protections implicitly or explicitly justify an
expectation of privacy by referring to a property interest.280 For
point that protecting "expectations of privacy" provides less protection to the poor than
to the wealthy. Stuntz, supra note 56.
277. That this is known as the "objective" prong of the Katz test serves only to
obfuscate the fact that the inquiry of what judges believe society will respect is just as
subjective as what the defendant believes society ought to respect. It is just another
perspective and hardly a representative one. For example, in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989), the Court generated four opinions regarding whether society would
recognize the defendant's expectation of privacy in his greenhouse. Id. at 446. The
greenhouse was surrounded by a fence which bore signs reading "DO NOT ENTER." Id.
at 448. Though ninety percent of the roof was covered, two panels were missing,
exposing a hole through which police looked from a helicopter. Id. The Court's various
opinions wondered whether the helicopter was flying at a legal height under FAA
regulations and how often helicopters flew at that height. Id. at 451 n.3, 453-55
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 458-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 467-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These are considerations that would hardly be
relevant to "society."
278. Submitting policy questions to judges under the guise of constitutional
adjudication necessarily leads to arbitrary results:
Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford rules of juridical
interpretation. They are different in different men. They are different in the
same men at different times. And when a strict interpretation of the
Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of
laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to
control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the
government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare
what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to
mean.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 620-21 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
279. See Cloud, supra note 47, at 72-73; see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,
93 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (cataloguing state constitutional precursors to Fourth
Amendment, which all protected "possessions" and "property").
280. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984) ("It is clear that the
actual placement of the beeper into the can violated no one's Fourth Amendment
rights. The can into which the beeper was placed belonged at the time to the
DEA .. "); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) ("A person who is aggrieved by
an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence
secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his
Fourth Amendment rights infringed."); Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.
2007) ('The warrantless administrative inspection, however, remains an exception to
the Fourth Amendment's general rule that a warrant-supported by probable cause
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example, in United States v. Grubbs, both the majority and
concurring opinions referred to the person targeted by a search
warrant as the "property owner."281 Even Katz itself relied on a
property interest to justify Charles Katz's expectation of privacy in
his telephone call. The Court reasoned that the call was private in
large part because Katz paid the toll to place the call.282 In other
words, Katz was entitled to expect privacy in his calls because he
bought those calls.283 This observation did not work itself into two of
the Court's opinions fortuitously. It is the most intuitive and best
reason for judges in a capitalistic society to deem the calls private. As
Entick recognized, the creation of property interests is the law's
vehicle for recognizing and affording privacy: "The great end for
which men entered into society was to secure their property.... By
the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute is a trespass."2s4
The Court's error in Katz was in hastening to rewrite the
Amendment rather than reconceptualizing "property."
Acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment protects property
interests does not require describing those interests in accordance
with state law or in any other legalistic manner, as they were prior to
Hayden.285 Doing so risks resurrecting the overly rigid Constitution
rightfully buried in 1967.286 Rather, "property" for Fourth
and specifying what is to be seized-is required when law enforcement seeks to search
private property."); Mary I. Coombs, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights
of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1616-22 (1987); Kerr, supra note 77, at 560-63
(arguing that search of hard drive image copied from owner's computer to
government's computer would not implicate Fourth Amendment because information
resided on government's, not defendant's, computer).
281. 547 U.S. at 98; id. at 101 (Souter, J., concurring).
282. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
283. The Court relied on this observation in Katz to explain why a passenger who
hires a taxicab is entitled to expect privacy in the cab's rear passenger seat area.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 n.16 (1978) (discussing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960)).
284. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B.).
285. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) ("[It is unnecessary and
ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any
other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely
historical."), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1980); Coombs,
supra note 280, at 1615 n.92 (1987) (suggesting that expansive notion of property
could be more satisfactory paradigm than privacy expectations).
286. Some Supreme Court opinions continue to suggest that Fourth Amendment
privacy expectations are related to legal property rights. See Kerr, supra note 77, at
516-19.
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Amendment purposes needs to be interpreted to further the
underlying purpose of protecting privacy. This calls for a pragmatic
interpretation that takes into account the way people live and what
they consider and treat as "their" property:
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion takes root in your being
and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and
trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can
ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man. 28 7
Under such a pragmatic approach, even something as ephemeral
and intangible as a telephone call can belong to the caller. Indeed, it
can belong simultaneously to both or all participants in the call. The
Bell companies understood this as far back as 1927. They argued in
an amici curiae brief filed in Olmstead v. United States2s8 that
telephone calls belong to the people who are conversing during those
calls:
When the lines of two "parties" are connected at the central
office, they are intended to be devoted to the exclusive use, and
in that sense to be turned over to the exclusive possession, of
the parties. A third person who taps the lines violates the
property rights of both persons then using the telephone, and of
the telephone company as well.289
This practical conception of property can explain why even an
originalist can acquiesce in the Katz outcome. 290
Presumably, service providers would take this position because it
helps their business to assure customers that the bargain they have
struck entails that customers retain control over their private
information.291 But this position is also in accord with what people
consider "their" papers and effects, as reflected in reactions to some
of the Supreme Court's attempts to gauge privacy expectations.
Legislation enacted in response to the Court's decisions reflects that
people in our society think of bank records and the telephone
287. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
288. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
289. Brief for Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al. as Amici Curiae, Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (No. 493).
290. But see Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 78-79 ("If one focuses on the
specific intent of the framers, the fourth amendment surely does not encompass
wiretaps.").
291. Internet service providers have successfully resisted divulging subscribers'
information to copyright holders seeking to discover the identities of people
transferring music over the Internet. See, e.g., In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Subpoena
Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc.
v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003); In re Subpoena to Univ. of
N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 945 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
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numbers they dial as "their" information although a service provider
maintains it. The same is true of e-mails, even when they are
composed or received on accounts that companies such as Yahoo or
Google provide for free.292 We understand that these companies
provide e-mail accounts because they hope to make money by
attracting people to their sites. We also expect that the companies
will hold our e-mails in confidence. This is all implicit in Katz's pay-
the-toll reasoning.
The Court's focus on privacy fails to account for this by reasoning
that any sharing of information with service providers is no different
than sharing information with an informant or friend who might
betray the trust. There is, of course, a difference between trusting a
turncoat informant not to reveal conversations and entrusting one's
financial dealings to a bank. A depositor has a contractual
relationship with a bank that entitles the depositor to retain control
over his financial information, regardless of who owns or possesses
the records. (Absent that understanding, presumably the depositor
would choose another bank.) That agreement is itself a property
interest that the Fourth Amendment should recognize in deciding
what constitutes a paper or an effect. In contrast, the understanding
that one's social confidantes will honor trust is not cognizable as a
property interest. This is exactly how people understand their affairs.
Justice Brandeis's Olmstead dissent borrowed approvingly from
the Bell companies' brief, though that opinion famously swept more
broadly. Rather than arguing that the Fourth Amendment should
protect intangible as well as tangible property, Justice Brandeis
argued that it should protect privacy.293 Justice Butler, however,
focused pointedly on the invasion of property entailed in wiretapping
and approved the Bell companies' position: "The contracts between
telephone companies and users contemplate the private use of the
facilities employed in the service. The communications belong to the
parties between whom they pass."294
Thus, Katz's ultimate adoption of a privacy rationale for Fourth
Amendment protection was not a "translation" of outmoded language
that merely accounted for technological innovation.295 It was a
292. Where an employer or other organization provides an e-mail account for
specific purposes, the sender may be found not to own the information or at least not
have exclusive ownership of it. But the idea that one's employer owns all the e-mails
sent over the company e-mail is far more intuitive than an open-ended privacy
expectation inquiry.
293. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting).
295. But see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1237-40
(1993) (arguing that Justice Brandeis's dissent merely "translated" Fourth
Amendment's original concern by adopting privacy rationale).
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substantive policy choice and a radical one at that. The Bell
companies' position, adopted by Judge Rudkin of the Ninth Circuit
before Justice Butler, extended constitutional protection to telephone
conversations, but did so merely by interpreting "papers" slightly
more broadly than before. If people's thoughts were in the telephonic
age to be carried by wires rather than papers, wrote Judge Rudkin,
"papers" should be understood to include those messages:
[I]t is the contents of the letter, not the mere paper, that is thus
protected. What is the distinction between a message sent by
letter and a message sent by telegraph or by telephone? True,
the one is visible, the other invisible; the one is tangible, the
other intangible; the one is sealed, and the other unsealed; but
these are distinctions without a difference. A person using the
telegraph or telephone is not broadcasting to the world. His
conversation is sealed from the public as completely as the
nature of the instrumentalities employed will permit, and no
federal officer or federal agent has a right to take his message
from the wires, in order that it may be used against him.296
Importantly, Judge Rudkin did not equate Fourth Amendment
protection with absolute secrecy, but thought it sufficient that the
conversation was as private as the telephone allowed it to be. This is
fundamentally at odds with the Court's repeated notion that the
mere risk that information will be shared compromises any privacy
expectation.297
Vindicating Justice Brandeis's more abstracted view of the
Amendment's scope, the Katz Court disregarded the text's specific
protection of property (and concomitant protection of privacy) in an
attempt to protect privacy directly. The Court gave no reason for its
abandonment of the Amendment's textual link to property, as Justice
Black noted in dissent.298 Katz's attempt to broaden the scope of the
Fourth Amendment in fact has enabled the Court to dispense with
individualized suspicion and exempt types of property, even tangible
property, from its reach when Justices with a different view of
296. Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1927) (Rudkin, J.,
dissenting).
297. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Colb,
supra note 168, at 126-44 (discussing Court's equating risk of disclosure with loss of
privacy expectation).
298. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("While I
realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no doubt
the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous
subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is the critical place to look
in construing a written document such as our Constitution.").
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privacy were appointed.299 In other words, substituting privacy for
property "abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then
eliminates the right."o Though Justice Black predicted that the
majority's rewriting of the Amendment would allow the Court to
thwart law enforcement,301 he would doubtlessly find the resulting
judicially created hierarchy of privacy expectations and disregard of
probable cause equally disconcerting.
Defining the Constitution's terms pragmatically to give effect to
the Framers' chosen methods of protecting the values embodied in
the Bill of Rights is not an unprecedented approach to constitutional
interpretation.302 Using this interpretive method, the Court recently
simplified and rationalized another convoluted body of constitutional
precedents. Before the Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington,3o3
the Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause3o4 as
requiring that hearsay statements admitted against an accused be in
some way reliable. Under Ohio v. Roberts, statements were deemed
admissible despite the Confrontation Clause's language if they came
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore other
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."35 This led state and
federal courts not only to reach conflicting decisions on the
admissibility of statements but to admit the very type of statements
that the Confrontation Clause was meant to bar.306 Crawford held
that the Confrontation Clause required that reliability be assessed in
a particular way-through cross-examination:
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be
sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
299. See generally Goldstein, supra note 83, at 1009-10 (describing "due process"
and "crime control" as well as idealist and realist views on criminal procedure);
Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-22
(1964) (describing how "due process" and "crime control" models affect substance and
procedure in criminal law).
300. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting) ("No general right is created by
the Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional
everything which affects privacy.").
302. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006) (holding that
right to counsel "commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of
fairness be provided-to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes
to be best"); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) ('"The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against compelled self-incrimination, not
merely against unreliable self-incrimination.").
303. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
304. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
305. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
306. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64.
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evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a
point on which there could be little dissent), but about how
reliability can best be determined.307
To determine whether a statement is "testimonial" and thus within
the Confrontation Clause's ambit, the Court now uses a practical
definition of the term,30 looking at the purpose of the Clause and the
concerns animating its Framers.309
Katz's approach to the Fourth Amendment is analogous to
Roberts's approach to the Confrontation Clause. Both disregarded the
Constitution's text in a misguided effort to get at its underlying
purpose. Both generated inconsistency, confusion, and (worst of all)
the very abuses the Constitution was meant to redress.
Crawford's reasoning is readily applied to the Fourth
Amendment, requiring just a little rephrasing of Justice Scalia's
opinion: Allowing a judge to decide what is and what is not a
legitimate expectation of privacy is fundamentally at odds with the
right to be secure in one's person and possessions. To be sure, the
Amendment's ultimate goal is the protection of privacy, but it
accomplishes this indirectly. The Amendment commands not that
judges decide when privacy expectations can be honored, but that the
government respects privacy in a particular manner: by respecting
property interests. The Amendment thus reflects a judgment not only
about the desirability of protecting privacy (a point on which there
could be little dissent), but about how privacy can best be protected.
Expounding the Bell companies' pragmatic understanding of
property would broaden the Fourth Amendment's reach beyond
tangible, legalistic property. It would also eliminate the guesswork
inherent to balancing and the arbitrary hierarchy of privacy
expectations by treating all property (including contraband)
307. Id. at 62.
308. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasizing that Crawford
provided that "testimonial" should be defined in "colloquial" rather than "technical,
legal" manner).
309. Likewise, the Court has long understood "probable cause" as a "practical,
nontechnical conception" embracing "the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176, 175 (1949)); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (collecting
cases).
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equally.310 This would result in a much more predictable and
consistent jurisprudence.
Balancing privacy expectations became a fixture of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as a refinement of the Katz test, initially
in the context of administrative searches3nl but quickly spreading to
criminal cases. 312 Because it posits that the government's "need" to
search-a consideration rejected as immaterial for centuries-can
affect the scope or weight of a constitutional right, balancing
necessarily involves courts in political decisions.313 Lord Camden
310. It merits noting that eliminating the expectations-of-privacy framework would
simplify the sometimes vexing issue of Fourth Amendment standing. Rather than
asking whether a search invaded a defendant's privacy expectation, see United States
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (holding that defendant could not contest illegal
search of bank officer's briefcase that led to discovery of incriminating loan guarantee
at defendant's bank); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) ("[W]e think the better
analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably
intertwined concept of standing."), the question would be whether one's property was
compromised. Statutes that require service providers to provide information to the
government in the name of "cooperating with law enforcement" would be subject to
constitutional challenge by the customer who owns the information. In other words, an
American in Shi Tao's situation would expect to have standing to challenge the
government seizure of his e-mails and might even expect to have a claim against
Yahoo. An extended discussion of standing is beyond the scope of this Article.
311. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (holding that reasonableness
of search can be determined only by balancing "the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails").
312. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
313. Indeed, whenever the Court purports to "balance" a government aim against
an individual right, it risks abandoning adjudication for policymaking. Justice Scalia
has for this reason decried the Court's politically charged foray into the abortion
controversy:
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were
doing essentially lawyers' work up here-reading text and discerning our
society's traditional understanding of that text-the public pretty much left
us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to
demonstrate about. But if in reality our process of constitutional
adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments... then a free
and intelligent people's attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to
be) quite different. The people know that their value judgments are quite as
good as those taught in any law school-maybe better.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000-01 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part). There are many situations, of course, where judges balance one
consideration against another. The probative value of evidence must always be
balanced against any unfair prejudice it might inspire or undue delay it might
occasion in a trial. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Even in the Fourth Amendment context,
balancing might be the only way to determine whether the manner in which a search
is conducted exceeds permissible bounds. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9
(1985) ('The same balancing process applied in the cases cited above demonstrates
that, notwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an officer may not always do
so by killing him."). However, one can concede that constitutional rights are not
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coyly dismissed in Entick the Crown's appeal to necessity as grounds
for allowing the seizure of Entick's papers because there was no
authority for it: "Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the
law towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power
would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I
will not say."314 Focused on the invasion of Entick's property
interests, Lord Camden saw no need to "balance" government needs
against privacy expectations.
Before 1967, the Supreme Court did not either. Justice Jackson's
opinion for the Court in United States v. Di Re, for example, rejected
the government's argument that, along with the power to search cars
without a warrant, it needed to make warrantless searches of all
passengers:
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is
said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law
enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But the
forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our
Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from
punishment.315
Because privacy has no inherent limiting principle, the attempt to
protect it directly forces courts to resort to balancing and thus gives
the government's necessity argument currency that it previously
lacked. Thus, considering a similar search of an automobile
passenger's purse, the modern Court distinguished Di Re in a
footnote on the ground that it involved the search of a person and not
merely of a person's property.316 The Court justified its decision,
however, by balancing: "Whereas the passenger's privacy
expectations are, as we have described, considerably diminished, the
governmental interests at stake are substantial."317
Balancing denies the very idea of rights by subjecting them to a
form of arbitration3ls and invites courts to denigrate the privacy
absolute without admitting that rights must cede whenever a judge finds a
government policy objective sufficiently weighty.
314. 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); see also
TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 34.
315. 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
316. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 n.1 (1999).
317. Id. at 304; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
318. As Justice Jackson wrote: 'The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts." W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 979-80 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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expectations of people whom judges deem inherently suspicious,
based on only the judges' own intuition. The hierarchy of Fourth
Amendment "legitimate" privacy expectations has been built by
piling such assumptions upon each other. Houses are acknowledged
as sitting atop the pyramid, receiving the greatest protection from
intrusion. Courts accord Fourth Amendment protection to other
effects depending bizarrely on the degree to which doing so burdens
the government. Thus, cases turn on such ideas as that owners of
junkyards are likely to be dealing in stolen cars,319 that high school
and middle school students are likely to be doing illegal drugs,320 and
that mobile home owners possess the ideal drug distribution
vehicle.321 A property approach would obviate such distinctions.
Declaring that suspicious groups have 'lower" privacy
expectations erodes the importance of individual suspicion as a
threshold condition for a search or seizure. It encourages judges to
decide Fourth Amendment questions on the basis of their own
personal assumptions about daily life even when balancing is not
required, reflecting an aloof judiciary's attempt to imagine how less
privileged people live.322 The Court, for example, has insisted that
people do not commonly keep personal possessions in their
automobiles,323 that passengers on a bus might feel free to decline
armed officers' request to search their bags,324 and that travelers
passing through a busy airport should not mind having their luggage
sniffed by a dog to prove to the police that they are not drug
couriers.325 All of these cases gave short shrift to property rights.
Katz's focus on privacy not only begat balancing but also
effectively reintroduced Boyd's fatal flaw, which Hayden meant to
319. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 713-14 (1987).
320. Bd. of Educ. ofIndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836-37 (2002).
321. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985) ("[T]o fail to apply the
[automobile] exception to vehicles such as a motor home ignores the fact that a motor
home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and other illegal
activity."); id. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In this case, the Court can barely
glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with recreational vehicles and mobile living
quarters.").
322. This is a reflection of Professor Ely's observation that the political process can
be counted on to protect "people like us." ELY, supra note 56, at 173. The only "political
process" involved in distinguishing legitimate privacy expectations from illegitimate
ones is a court decision. Judges can be counted on to protect people from searches that
might be inflicted on them or people like them. They are less likely to be sympathetic
to high school students, mobile home owners, and junkyard owners.
323. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
324. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 437-38 (1991).
325. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983).
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eradicate. Just as Boyd distinguished between property that could be
trespassed and contraband, Kyllo and Caballes distinguish between
information that is always sacrosanct (anything that happens inside
a home no matter how banal) and information that one has no right
to conceal (the presence of marijuana in one's trunk). Like Boyd, this
shifts the Fourth Amendment away from asking whether the police
were acting with a good reason to asking what they were seeking.
Thus, the privacy regime allows the Court to find that contraband
like marijuana, as well as information entrusted to third-party
service providers, is not private and therefore not constitutionally
protected. This undermines the Amendment's core purpose of curbing
arbitrary government inspections.
Declaring that one has no right to conceal drugs from the police
is indistinguishable from declaring that one has no right to conceal
seditious writings from the Crown. True, it is illegal to possess
certain items, and, as a result, the law will not formally recognize a
property interest in contraband. Further, Justice Stevens's
pronouncement that "any hopes or expectations concerning the
nondetection of contraband" are categorically illegitimate seems
positively to peal with verity and good sense.326 But Caballes is
wrong. Lord Carrington recognized in Entick that the authorities
could seize materials that were in fact seditious libel because there
was no right to possess those.327 The Crown's right to possess such
papers, however, did not imply an ability to search for them without
specific, well-grounded suspicions. It follows that the Fourth
Amendment's protections cannot depend on whether a search will
uncover only contraband.328
Recognizing that reliance on the lack of a technical property
interest in contraband was a dubious way to render a search legal,
the Court noted in Hayden that the government has a superior
interest in contraband "only because the Government decides to vest
such an interest in itself."329 The Hayden majority almost grasped
that contraband must be protected along with other possessions
when it quizzically noted that "there may be limits to what may be
326. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
327. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B.).
328. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 (1951) (holding that contraband
nature of narcotics did not justify warrantless search and seizure); see also Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 707 (1948), overruled in part by United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
329. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n.11 (1967); cf. Lessig, supra note 295, at
1230-32 (arguing that states' power between Wolf and Mapp to alter Fourth
Amendment protection of property interests by changing substantive law of trespass
augured imposition of exclusionary rule).
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declared contraband."330 One would have to look hard to find in the
Fourth Amendment such a limitation. Rather, what must be
recognized is that the constitutionality of a search in no way depends
on whether the government seeks seditious writings, uncustomed
goods, stolen goods, bootlegged liquor, bank records, e-mails, or
marijuana.331 As Judge Learned Hand colorfully put it, "Nor should
we forget that what seems fair enough against a squalid huckster of
bad liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government
determined to suppress political opposition under the guise of
sedition."32 Thus, a dog sniff is a search even if it detects only
marijuana.333 It follows that the government has no authority, as
Justice Ginsburg perceived but did not explain, to have dogs sniff
cars stopped for traffic infractions even if it causes no delay.334
One might respond that, even if the Fourth Amendment does
protect property, having a dog sniff a car while it is stopped for an
unrelated reason is no different from a person looking at that car,
which even a property-based Fourth Amendment does not prevent.335
The Court's common sense approach to defining "search" in Hicks
answers this objection. That case held that the police officers'
handling of a turntable was a "search" because it was action beyond
simple, incidental observation unrelated to the reason for the initial
intrusion.336 Under that approach, Caballes would scarcely raise an
issue worth discussing because the dog sniff was not "incidental
330. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306 n.11.
331. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("A search is a search, even if it
happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."); United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) ("We have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is
not to be made legal by what it turns up."); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30
(1927) ("A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by
what it brings to light.").
332. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
333. In fact, the reliability of drug-detecting dogs is dubious. See Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ('The infallible dog, however, is a
creature of legal fiction."). Justice Souter's concerns were validated by State v. Nguyen,
726 N.W.2d 871 (S.D. 2007), where the Supreme Court of South Dakota found a drug-
detecting dog that falsely alerted fifty-four percent of the time to be reliable based on
its certification and training. See id. at 875. Despite the fact that the dog was wrong
more often than not about the presence of drugs, the court found that the animal's
indication alone constituted probable cause. Id. at 884.
334. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The unwarranted and
nonconsensual expansion of the seizure here from a routine traffic stop to a drug
investigation broadened the scope of the investigation in a manner that, in my
judgment, runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.").
335. This of course begs the question of what it means to be stopped for an
"unrelated reason." Police who in fact stop cars for a traffic infraction do not
conveniently happen to have a drug dog at the ready. Rather, police use traffic stops as
a pretext for doing dragnet-style drug interdiction. Bascuas, supra note 113, at 759-63.
336. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1987).
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observation" and had no connection to the traffic stop. In both Hicks
and Caballes, the police sought without probable cause to determine
whether the defendant had something he had no right to possess
(stolen stereo equipment and drugs, respectively). Just like lifting the
turntable to see its serial number, the dog sniffing the car was action
meant to discover information not incidentally observable.
The Hicks majority rejected Justice O'Connor's suggestion of
allowing police to make "cursory inspections" of suspicious items.337
Mercifully, the Court held that defining "search" was already
confusing enough without sending "police and judges into a new
thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain
description that is neither a 'plain view' inspection nor yet a 'full-
blown search."'338 But that is more or less what the Court sanctioned
in Caballes: Police cannot open a car's trunk without probable cause;
that would be a "search." But they can have a dog take a cursory sniff
that will tell them what is in the trunk.
Hicks did not control Caballes because the Court had said in
United States v. Place that a dog sniff that detects only contraband is
not a Fourth Amendment "search."339 Place's actual holding was that
seizing a passenger's suitcase and transporting it from one airport to
another to have a drug dog sniff it was an unconstitutional seizure.340
In prolix dicta addressing an issue that was not briefed,341 the Court
advised police that stopping passengers for a quick whiff of their
luggage would be constitutional "[gliven the enforcement problems
associated with the detection of narcotics trafficking and the minimal
intrusion that a properly limited detention would entail."342 This is a
stark illustration of how balancing implicitly posits that the Fourth
Amendment must yield to allow for the enforcement of whatever
crimes Congress creates, eviscerating the very concept of rights.
Through balancing, Place exempts from constitutional protection
certain property for the express purpose of facilitating drug
interdiction.343
337. Id. at 333 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 328-29 (majority opinion).
339. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
340. Id. at 710.
341. Id. at 711 (Brennan, J., concurring).
342. Id. at 698 (majority opinion).
343. Id. at 703. Place is far from the only example of the Court interpreting the
Fourth Amendment expressly to facilitate enforcement of drug laws. See, e.g., Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002) ("[T]he nationwide drug
epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school."); California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985) (holding that motor home could be searched
without a warrant because "a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of
illicit drug traffic and other illegal activity").
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Kyllo similarly invited the Court to dispense with any
requirement of individualized suspicion for house searches that could
detect only evidence of contraband. But the Court held that the
measuring of heat waves emanating from a house was a search and
could not be undertaken without probable cause and a warrant. 344
The decision did not so much as cite Place, although Justice Stevens's
dissent pointed out the tension between that case and the Court's
holding.345 Perhaps to explain the distinction, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion emphasized that houses were more protected than
other property. 346 Had the Court not gone out of its way in Place to
advise police to keep hounds in every airport, Kyllo would have been
an easier case. Both cases presented situations where police tried to
learn what an individual possessed (whether inside a house or a
suitcase) without probable cause. 347
Despite these needless complexities and irreconcilable
rationales, scholars as well as judges generally accept without
question that some things are "more private" and therefore entitled
to greater constitutional solicitude than others. Professor Orin Kerr,
for example, asked what place in the hierarchy personal computers
occupy: "Computers are like containers in a physical sense, homes in
a virtual sense, and vast warehouses in an informational sense.
Which insights should govern?"348 Adopting Professor Kerr's
approach and surveying caselaw from other circuits, the Tenth
Circuit recently decided that, within the Fourth Amendment privacy
hierarchy, computers "should fall into the same category as suitcases,
footlockers, or other personal items that 'command a high degree of
privacy."'349 The court approved federal agents' warrantless search of
a computer relying on the consent of the owner's father, who did not
know how to use the computer.350 Agents arrived at the house at 8:45
a.m. when Ray Andrus, whom they suspected of having images of
344. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
345. Id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 40 (majority opinion) (Scalia, J.).
347. Focusing on probable cause would admittedly not answer Justice Stevens's
concerns that police should not be prevented from detecting chemical or biological
weapons hidden in residences. That eventuality could be dealt with under the test I
proposed elsewhere. See Bascuas, supra note 113, at 780-91. More fundamentally, it
may be impossible to build constitutional rules for a free society that account for a
doomsday scenario. The police should undoubtedly go to far greater lengths to keep a
pipe bomb from detonating than to keep a marijuana pipe from smoking. Cf. Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
348. Kerr, supra note 77, at 533.
349. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992)) (brackets omitted).
350. Andrus, 483 F.3d. at 715.
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child pornography, was at work.351 His ninety-one-year-old father
"answered the door in his pajamas."352 Agents used forensic software
to bypass the password protection and read the data without turning
the computer on.35 3 The court held that the agents reasonably
believed Dr. Andrus had authority to consent to the search even
though he did not own the computer only because it was in a place
where he could potentially access it.354
Locating a computer's place in the privacy hierarchy by
analogizing it to a suitcase or footlocker is doomed to be
unenlightening.355 The reason for this is that there is nothing more
inherently "private" about a suitcase, a footlocker, or a computer
than a turntable. What matters is what information might be
discovered by examining these items. Like lifting Hicks's turntable,
searching Ray Andrus's computer could disclose his private papers,
letters, and photographs. Indeed, the agents, despite believing they
lacked probable cause, sought precisely those things.356 The same
was true of Andrus's credit card records and Internet account, which
federal agents were able to search before searching his computer
because, under current law, they were not sufficiently private.357
Approaching Fourth Amendment questions with analogies
likening computers to foot lockers or file cabinets is a bad approach
because it leaves search law to be molded based on judges' own
personal experiences with new technology and on the impact
technology has on attitudes toward privacy.358 In the near future, for
example, it is likely that documents-even extremely private ones-
now commonly stored on hard drives will be stored on the servers of
companies that offer Internet-based word-processing, spreadsheet,
and other applications.359 Of what use is comparing a computer to a
351. Id. at 713.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 713-14.
354. Id. at 722.
355. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 77, at 555 ("If you analogize a computer hard drive to
a suitcase, each file is like its own zippered pocket in the suitcase. A computer is like a
container that stores thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete files.").
356. 483 F.3d at 724 n.4 (McKay, J., dissenting).
357. See id. at 713 (majority opinion) ("The credit card number provided to Regpay
was determined to belong to Ray Andrus. The email address provided to Regpay,
bandrus@kc.rr.com, was determined to be associated with Dr. Bailey Andrus.").
358. Kyllo emphasized that what is deemed private in the future will be a function
in part of whether the technology that could reveal sought-after information was "in
general public use." 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). This suggests that adopters of privacy-
invading technology like GPS-equipped cellular phones can compromise the privacy of
those who object to having that information revealed.
359. See Gwendolyn Bounds, Online Tools Give Home-Based Firms Office-Style
Services, Providers Like Google and Microsoft Tout Low Cost, Ease of Use, WALL ST. J.,
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footlocker then? The current Fourth Amendment framework risks
deeming those documents "not private" because they are shared with
the third-party service providers. Of course, given the
unpredictability of the Katz test, the Court might just as well come
out the other way. It is impossible to predict.
Adopting a pragmatic notion of property based on what people
consider "theirs" as the Fourth Amendment's main concern
eliminates the confusing talk of "privacy expectations" and the need
to balance, thereby removing political considerations and much
subjectivity from Fourth Amendment analysis.360 Even issues
regarding government inspection of private information that must be
shared with third-party service providers-bank records,361 e-
mails,362 Web surfing activity,363 and the like-become much easier to
answer. Just as the Bell companies understood in 1927 that their
customers owned their phone conversations, today's service providers
understand the need to safeguard their customers' confidences
through contractual arrangements. 364 The Court's failure to recognize
contractual rights as property protected by the Fourth Amendment
emboldens the government to force private companies to become
surveillance agents and to divulge information that consumers would
expect service providers to hold private.365 The risk of suspicionless,
Sept. 11, 2007, at B8; Matt Richtel, Facing Free Software, Microsoft Looks To Yahoo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at Al; Eric A. Taub, Help With Your Business, Often Free, On
the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at Gil.
360. To some extent, courts already do this. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,
95-96 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Of course this is not to say that the Fourth
Amendment protects only the Lord of the Manor who holds his estate in fee simple.
People call a house 'their' home when legal title is in the bank, when they rent it, and
even when they merely occupy it rent free-so long as they actually live there.").
361. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that bank
customer had no expectation of privacy in bank records because "depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to [the bank], that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government") (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52
(1971)).
362. Cf. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
customers of Internet service provider maintain reasonable expectation of privacy in
content of e-mails despite reliance on provider to deliver e-mails).
363. Cf. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
university student maintained reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer even
though he connected to university's network).
364. See, e.g., Holson, supra note 78 (stating that phone companies recognize
business would be hurt if consumers viewed social-mapping services as too intrusive).
365. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1021 (2000) (requiring telecommunications carriers and equipment
manufacturers to ensure that government agents can conduct surveillance with
companies' facilities). The Bush administration's recruitment of telecommunications
companies to eavesdrop on conversations is the subject of an on-going controversy that
merits close study once all the details of the operations come to light. See Eric
636 [Vol. 60:3
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generalized searches would be diminished and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence would be simplified by relying on common
understandings of ownership. Conversely, information not protected
by such a relationship, such as a government employee's Web surfing
activity on a government computer, would not be protected.366
Rather than analogizing among containers in a contrived privacy
hierarchy, courts should focus on whether a search vitiates the
Amendment's express protection of "papers and effects," whether
locked in a safe, stored on a hard drive, or hidden under a record
player.367 Asking judges to decide whether people consider an e-mail
or text message or phone conversation "theirs" minimizes judicial
guesswork regarding societal expectations and allows for the
presentation of evidence, including the contracts between individuals
and service providers,368 expert testimony, and lay testimony. As a
result, a pragmatic property-based approach is much more likely to
yield satisfactory, consistent, and predictable results because judges
can more readily grasp innovations in the area of property than in
the amorphous realm of privacy expectations.
B. The Primacy of Probable Cause
Eliminating the indeterminacy of the "expectations of privacy"
framework will be fruitless if the government can neutralize the
Fourth Amendment's guarantees by complying with an empty
warrant procedure. If the warrant procedure was an empty
formalism before the Court's introduction of the "good faith"
exception, it is now a vicious deception. Before Leon, a magistrate
Lichtblau, James Risen & Scott Shane, Wider Spying Fuels Aid Plan For Telecoms,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at All (discussing various eavesdropping programs and
noting that one company refused to cooperate in tapping calls to Latin America to
uncover drug trafficking).
366. Cf. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
federal employee "lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded
from the Internet" to computer owned by federal government). But see United States v.
Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that employee of private company
maintained reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace computer).
367. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("It matters not that the search
uncovered nothing of great personal value to respondent-serial numbers rather than
(what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or
photographs. A search is a search .... ").
368. No doubt at least some Internet service providers would stop cooperating with
the government if the law allowed them to resist such claims. Internet service
providers, for example, have expended what must be considerable resources to resist
divulging customers' names who allegedly distributed copyrighted music. See, e.g., In
re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.
2005); Record Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003). This suggests they see it in the interest of their bottom line to protect
customers' information.
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judge's review of a warrant application supplemented a defendant's
after-the-fact adversarial challenge. By making the warrant
procedure the exclusive test of the government's grounds for a
search, the Court converted probable cause from a substantive to a
procedural requirement and insulated government action from
scrutiny.369
Despite this fundamental change in the function of a warrant,
legal scholarship regarding the sagacity or legality of dispensing with
the warrant requirement has continued to assume that warrants
protect individuals. Scholars have focused on cataloguing speculative
assumptions weighing the warrant requirement's supposed benefits
to targets against its costs to law enforcement, ignoring that Leon
renders the discussion anachronistic.370 Now, warrants benefit only
law enforcement and deprive individuals of their opportunity to
challenge the prosecution's claim to probable cause. 71 Adding to the
decision's irrationality, Leon insisted that the "good faith" exception
would not reduce the incentive for targets to challenge a magistrate's
probable cause finding. It encouraged courts to decide whether
probable cause was shown before concluding that the "good faith"
doctrine made the point academic.372 Lawyers, of course, typically do
not waste time making such pointless arguments.
Offered the choice between an ex ante, ex parte proceeding based
on one-sided evidence and an adversarial evidentiary hearing where
the government must demonstrate probable cause, any criminal
defense lawyer (and fully informed defendant) would choose the
latter.373 Warrants, in other words, effectively lower the degree of
369. See Dripps, supra note 102, at 907 ("In effect, Leon does less to effect an
exception to the exclusionary rule than to substitute a procedural for a substantive
definition of probable cause; probable cause within bounds of plain error is whatever a
magistrate says it is."); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 31 ("[W]hen the
appropriate procedure is utilized, the Court frequently has refused to invalidate the
resulting search even though it might have concluded as an original matter that the
substantive demands of the amendment were not satisfied.").
370. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 86, at 897-918 (arguing that warrants may serve to
counteract judicial bias against criminal defendants, prevent police perjury in
justifying searches, and prevent excessive damages awards to victims of illegal
searches); James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the
Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1156 (1992) ("Like the arguments
over the warrant rule's privacy protection value, the arguments over its law
enforcement costs are based on speculation and assertion.").
371. Leon thus permits something the Fourth Amendment expressly prohibits:
warrants not supported by probable cause. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note
82, at 33.
372. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 & n.25 (1984).
373. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the warrant procedure
has any inherent value. A "procedure" that involves only government employees
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scrutiny given to the government's reasons for making some of the
most intrusive searches (those not subject to an exception to the
warrant requirement).374 The Department of Justice's obtaining a
warrant from Judge Hogan before searching Congressman
Jefferson's office, for example, afforded the Congressman little if any
protection that a warrantless search subject to an after-the-fact
hearing would not have provided more effectively. Not having an
essentially unreviewable warrant on which to rely would also likely
have made the Department of Justice even more cautious in
undertaking that search. This would have been true even if the
reviewing judge had not been the issuing judge; a judge is
presumably much more likely to hold that a prosecutor erred in
assessing probable cause than that a colleague did.
The Court gravely erred in Leon because it assumed that the
reason for subjecting a magistrate's ex ante probable cause
determination to ex post adversarial testing was to punish the police
for cutting constitutional corners. Saying that the exclusionary rule
is intended "to deter police misconduct" and that the Fourth
Amendment is therefore unconcerned with negligent or careless
violations of the rights it safeguards is a silly feat of legerdemain. (In
fact, judicial integrity is a more justifiable basis for the Court to
create exclusionary rules.375) Even if one describes the exclusionary
rule's purpose as "deterring police misconduct," that must mean not
only discouraging deliberate violations but also giving law
enforcement agencies an incentive to train and supervise officers to
carefully observe Fourth Amendment rights.376
(prosecutors, agents, judges) deprives the person whose interests are at stake of any
chance to participate.
374. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 82, at 44 (explaining that Leon
"provides strong incentives" for police to obtain warrants by "virtually insulating the
search from attack in cases in which a warrant is secured").
375. This was the view Justice Holmes consistently took of the reason for excluding
evidence seized in violation of the Constitution. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("For those who agree with me no
distinction can be taken between the government as prosecutor and the government as
judge. If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such
dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed.");
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.) ('The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all.")
376. So understood, the exclusionary rule's primary aim is not to afford a remedy
for a wronged criminal defendant, but to provide a judicial check on executive power.
For that reason, scholarly characterizations of the rule and of the Fourth Amendment
generally as being intended to afford tort-like relief akin to restitution are at best
imperfect analogies. See Amar, supra note 68, at 1119 (describing Fourth Amendment
as "constitutional tort law"); Amar, supra note 39, at 758 (same); Stuntz, supra note
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Violations of constitutional rights are strict liability events; no
particular mens rea on the part of government agents is required.
This proposition is simply the converse of the Court's repeated
insistence that "[slubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."377 If the facts turn out
to be such that no probable cause existed because either the court or
the police made an error, what difference does it make that the police
had pure intentions? Why should an officer's subjective belief matter
when his intentions are good, but not matter if he stops only
Hispanic speeders? Leon provides police an incentive simply to do
what is necessary to get a warrant, which is a world away from doing
what is necessary to respect rights. Worse, Leon has been extended to
apply when the police make warrantless searches or arrests without
intending to violate the Constitution, such as when court or police
records incorrectly reflect an outstanding warrant 378 or when it
seems they have consent to enter a home but actually do not.379
The idea that negligent but unconstitutional searches and
seizures should not result in any consequence to the government
negates one of the principal assumptions on which the Fourth
Amendment depends for it to make any sense. Professor Telford
Taylor and Professor Akhil Reed Amar have pointed out that
warrants were issued at common law to protect the individual
carrying out the search from a future tort suit.380 If the search was
unjustified, a warrant would preclude a damages award.381 An
aggrieved target could, despite any warrant, nonetheless seek the
return of anything seized if cause for the search were found
lacking.382 Similarly, if the police violate the Constitution negligently
but not deliberately, they are not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.383 But the government has no authority to make use of the
unlawfully seized property. The exclusionary rule thus gives the best
incentive for agencies to ensure that probable cause exists for every
86, at 883-84, 899-900 (describing exclusionary rule as "restitutionary" and Fourth
Amendment law as "essentially, tort law for police"). That the defendant who brings a
motion to suppress illegally seized evidence benefits does not convert a constitutional
limitation of government power into a constitutional tort.
377. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); accord Brigham City v.
Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 138 (2006);
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004).
378. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212
(11th Cir. 2007).
379. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
380. TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 39-41; Amar, supra note 39, at 773-74.
381. Amar, supra note 39, at 774.
382. TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 82.
383. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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search and seizure, not merely those that are deliberately violative of
rights.384
Whatever its utility before Leon, the warrant procedure with a
"good faith" exception offers the target of a search no benefit
whatsoever. The Supreme Court used to profess that warrants
reassured the person whose property was being searched and seized
of the officers' authority to search and of the limits of that
authority.385 More recently, the Court has held that warrants are not
meant to provide any such notice. In Groh v. Ramirez, Justice
Stevens's majority opinion noted that the Fourth Amendment does
not require law enforcement "to serve notice on the owner before
commencing the search."386 A few years later, in Grubbs v. United
States,387 a different majority reiterated that there was no
requirement that warrants be presented at the outset of a search.
Despite this, Justice Souter's concurring opinion quizzically insisted
that whether the Constitution ever requires officers to present a
warrant before searching remains undetermined.388
Nor does the warrant requirement do much to limit the
discretion of the police in the manner in which they execute a
warrant. Police officers must necessarily exercise judgment in how
they make a search and in what they seize. A warrant does not
authorize them to do anything that might come within a warrant's
literal terms,389 but neither does the warrant prevent police from
going overboard.390 Nor is it possible to expect judges in our
384. See generally Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary
Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 119, 123-27 (2003) (arguing that police routinely
and deliberately engaged in unconstitutional searches prior to adoption of the
exclusionary rule and that alternative remedies are inadequate to prevent abuses).
385. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 9 (1977); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
386. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004) ("Quite obviously, in some
circumstances-a surreptitious search by means of a wiretap, for example, or the
search of empty or abandoned premises-it will be impracticable or imprudent for the
officers to show the warrant in advance.").
387. 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2006) ("This argument assumes that the executing officer
must present the property owner with a copy of the warrant before conducting his
search. In fact, however, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure imposes such a requirement.") (citation omitted).
388. Id. at 99-103 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he right of an owner to demand to see
a copy of the warrant before making way for the police ... remains undetermined
today.").
389. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
390. See, e.g., San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San
Jose, 402 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that seizure of expensive motorcycles,
seizure of refrigerator door, seizure of sidewalk removed by jackhammer, and shooting
of guard dogs pursuant to execution of warrant to search for "any" indicia of affiliation
with motorcycle club was unreasonable); see also Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232, 1244
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adversarial system to supervise the execution of warrants and the
gathering of evidence to minimize breaches.391
The only remaining utility a warrant might provide a defendant
is that it requires the police to create a record of their basis for
believing probable cause exists.392 Probable cause must be
determined from the facts known to the police prior to any search,
and forcing the police to apply for a warrant makes it more difficult
(though not impossible393) for them to justify searches after the
fact.394 But the government already bears the burden of proving that
the many warrantless searches made under current law are
supported by probable cause when they are made.395 To shoulder that
burden, police and prosecutors keep records. Defense counsel are
experienced in challenging these assertions. This is also the method
used to test whether evidence proffered by the government is the
fruit of immunized conversations or testimony.396 Given that warrant
(11th Cir. 2007) (holding that warrantless search of auto salvage yard came within
administrative-search exception to warrant requirement, but that "para-military" raid
by twenty officers "with automatic shotguns and sidearms drawn" was
'ardly... what the Supreme Court had in mind.., when it held that the
Constitution is not offended by statutes authorizing the regular, routine inspection of
books and records required to be kept by auto salvagers").
391. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 77, at 575 ("Given the contingent nature of the
process, even a skilled forensic expert cannot predict exactly what techniques will be
necessary to find the information sought by the warrant.").
392. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 743 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Petitioners would have been forced to articulate their exact reasons for the search
and to specify the items in Dr. Ortega's office they sought, which would have
prevented the general rummaging through the doctor's office, desk, and file cabinets.");
Stuntz, supra note 86, at 925 (stating that warrants force police to "record what they
know before the search takes place, and thus make it harder to lie about what they
knew when they testify at suppression hearings").
393. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (holding that officers who
conduct illegal search may seek warrant on basis of information obtained independent
of illegal conduct and may conceal illegal conduct from issuing judge); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding that evidence discovered pursuant to
search warrant was not subject to exclusionary rule though officers entered apartment
illegally before obtaining warrant).
394. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967); United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) ("We have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is
not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and
does not change character from its success."); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-
30 (1927) ("A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by
what it brings to light; and the doctrine has never been recognized by this court, nor
can it be tolerated under our constitutional system, that evidences of crime discovered
by a federal officer in making a search without lawful warrant may be used against
the victim of the unlawful search where a timely challenge has been interposed.").
395. Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 169-70 (1968).
396. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (placing burden of
proving that evidence is not fruit of immunized testimony on government).
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applications can be supported by hearsay from undisclosed sources,
the warrant procedure does little if anything to prevent police from
concocting probable cause if they choose. By insulating warrant
affidavits from adversary testing, the "good faith" exception makes it
that much easier to lie.
Prior to Leon, the availability of ex post as well as ex ante review
of probable cause underscored that the ex ante determination was
contingent and prophylactic. Leon made it virtually determinative for
the apparent purpose of sparing magistrates the embarrassment of
having warrants invalidated. Had Leon addressed the problem of
defective warrants by eliminating the warrant procedure rather than
by eliminating adversarial challenges to probable cause, defendants
would be better off. For example, the Department of Justice would
have had to decide whether to search a congressional office without
the judiciary's ex ante involvement or approval. It would do this in
exactly the way that police now undertake most searches-by having
its agents and prosecutors confer and decide on their own and at
their peril whether probable cause justified the intrusion.
Congressman Jefferson and the House of Representatives would then
have been able to challenge that assessment with a thoroughness
simply not possible in an ex ante, ex parte proceeding. That
opportunity is now denied.
The futility of the warrant procedure shows how far removed
current jurisprudence is from the Fourth Amendment's purpose. The
Fourth Amendment cannot curb general searches if it is interpreted
in a way that devalues probable cause. A well-grounded, articulable
belief that crime is occurring or has occurred is the difference
between specific searches and the general searches that the Framers
understood were instruments of oppression. While searches without
probable cause might well be permitted in situations where
imminent physical harm is threatened, such allowances can be made
on a principled basis without resort to balancing.397 Worse than being
merely futile, the insistence on warrants has caused the Court to
excuse the more fundamental and important requirement of probable
cause whenever a warrant issues. Substituting form for substance,
the Court has excused compliance with the substantive probable
cause showing whenever government agents demonstrate their pure
intentions by indulging an empty procedure for obtaining a piece of
paper.
397. See Bascuas, supra note 113, at 777-78.
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V. CONCLUSION
Law must be predictable to be of any use.398 Predicating the
Fourth Amendment's protection on "expectations of privacy" makes
its scope unpredictable and needlessly complicated. Compounding
the confusion is the idea that the warrant procedure provides
substantial protection of those privacy interests the Court certifies
are legitimate. Refocusing the law on the Amendment's text in light
of its historical underpinnings suggests that two reforms are vital to
restoring Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to a principled
methodology.
First, privacy and property must be understood not as competing
Fourth Amendment values or objects of concern but as interrelated
concepts. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy by safeguarding
property from government intrusion except when there is good cause
to believe a crime has occurred or is occurring. Property interests
generally delineate privacy interests. Unlike abstract privacy
expectations, property interests cannot be compromised through
judicial weighing of government "needs." Nor should vague talk of
"minimal intrusions" justify government incursions. Property exists
to protect an owner's desire, however irrational, to exclude others
from having anything to do with it.399 This idea is inherent in the
very root of trespass, as Lord Camden noted:
No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license,
but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing;
which is proved by every declaration in trespass, where the
defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and
even treading upon the soil.400
Property should be understood in a broad, nontechnical sense to
protect whatever people consider and treat as "their" property.
Second, it must be acknowledged that the rhetoric regarding the
virtues of the warrant procedure has no place in the context of
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Even if warrants ever
offered much protection in our adversarial system, they now serve
principally to deprive a defendant of an adversary hearing. Rather
398. See Holmes, supra note 287, at 457 ("People want to know under what
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this
danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.").
399. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 619-22 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that harm from Fourth Amendment violation results even where
there is no damage to property or embarrassment resulting from intrusion on privacy).
400. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B.).
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than insisting on compliance with the warrant procedure, the Court
should insist on across-the-board compliance with the probable cause
standard, as the Framers were concerned with unjustified, general
searches. The Fourth Amendment's core command is not that all
searches be accompanied by a warrant. That, as experience has
shown, is impossible. The Amendment's concern is that searches be
specific, i.e., that they be made only when there is a good reason to
believe that a particular individual has committed a particular crime.
That, and only that, is what "probable cause" has always meant: "The
substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt."4o1 Warrants may help advance that goal
but they have no intrinsic worth. Only by strictly enforcing the
Amendment's probable cause requirement and strictly limiting
exceptions to those necessary to thwart imminent threats of physical
injury can the law serve the Amendment's purpose.
401. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)
("Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a
prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. It is important, we
think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the
Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen."); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. (7
Otto) 642, 645 (1878) ("If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to
warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been
committed, it is sufficient."); see Bascuas, supra note 113, at 745-48.
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